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I have taught legal ethics for seven years and still do not fully understand
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) Rule 8.5.' You remember.., that's the rule that states that a
lawyer admitted to practice in one jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary
authority of that jurisdiction even when the lawyer is engaged in practice in
a different jurisdiction. As the Comment to Rule 8.5 points out, lawyers
frequently practice now in more than one jurisdiction. And the rules of
professional conduct in the two jurisdictions may impose conflicting obliga-
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. A
proposal to amend Rule 8.5 will be considered at the August, 1993 ABA Annual Meeting. [9
Current Reports], Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 11:173-174 (June 30, 1993).
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tions on the lawyer. Imagine, for example, a lawyer licensed in both New
Jersey and the District of Columbia who learns of a current client's intent to
commit financial fraud. Must the lawyer reveal the client's fraud or must the
lawyer remain silent? In fact, both silence and revelation are required.2 A
solution to the dilemma of how to simultaneously talk and keep silent is
offered in the Comment to Rule 8.5. This Comment, which states that
"applicable rules of choice of law may govern the situation,"3 requires
mastery of yet another subject (perhaps under time pressure) and seems
less than ideal.
Ironically, the ethical dilemmas posed by a multi-state practice may
eventually be easier to resolve when the multi-state practice arises between
France and Germany than when the multi-state practice is between New
Jersey and the District of Columbia. The reason why there might be fewer
dilemmas in Europe is because there is now a legal ethics code for lawyers in
the European Community that attempts to mitigate the difficulties which
could result if a lawyer is subject to conflicting ethics rules. This legal ethics
code is called the CCBE Code of Conduct (CCBE Code).4
2. Compare D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1991) (Confidentiality of
Information) with N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1984) (Confidentiality of
Information).
3. MODEL RULES Rule 8.5 cmt.
4. See CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT (1988) [hereinafter CCBE CODE]. This CCBE ethics code has
been reprinted in several sources. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 526 (1993); John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of
ProfessionalEthics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673, 686 (1991-92) (reviewing the history and provisions
of the CCBE Code); CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM ch. 4 at 15 (Dorothy Margaret
Donald-Little ed., 1991) [hereinafter CCBE COMPENDIUM]. The CCBE Code is reproduced in its
entirety, infra Appendix B; see also infra Appendix A (comparing the CCBE Code and the Model
Rules). The code is also available directly from the CCBE, Rue Washington 40, B-1050 Brussels,
Belgium. In Europe, this code is typically referred to as either the "CCBE Code" or the "Common
Code."
The CCBE Code of Conduct has been discussed in several books and articles, although few have
focused exclusively on it. The resources discussing the CCBE Code include: HAMISH ADAMSON,
FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS (Butterworths ed. 1992)[hereinafter ADAMSON] (describing forms of
practice of the legal profession in the EC); Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community:
Progress Towards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556 (1991-92) [herein-
after Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community] (written by one of the leading U.S. experts, this
article focuses primarily on the substantive EC law governing lawyers, but includes a discussion of
the CCBE Code, including jurisdictional issues); Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and
Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Goebel, Professional Qualification] (discussing transnational legal
practice); Geoffrey Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., March 30, 1992, at 13 (noting the similarities
between the CCBE Code and Model Code); Nicholas J. Skarlatos, European Lawyer's Right to
Transnational Legal Practice in the European Community, I LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 49
(1991) (commenting on the difficulties of transnational legal practice and reviewing measures taken
to improve the system); Toulmin, supra. In addition to these articles, numerous articles on specific
CCBE Code provisions and the substantive EC law regulating lawyers are found in the journals
Lawyers in Europe and the International Financial Law Review.
In addition to the above resources, which discuss the CCBE Code in at least some depth, there are
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This is the first article of a two-part series which introduces and analyzes
the legal ethics provisions of the European Community (EC). The first four
sections of this first article offer information about the background, author-
a number of resources that have focused on the substantive European Community law governing
lawyers, and in doing so, have mentioned the CCBE Code in passing. These resources include the
following: H. Brankhorst, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services under the
EEC-Treaty, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 245 (1975) (commenting on the impact of several judgments
handed down by the International Court of Justice and several articles of the EEC Treaty); H.
Brankhorst, Lawyers' Freedom Under the New Directive, 2 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1977) (discussing the
legal problems & the individual provisions of Directive 77/249/EEC); D.A.O. Edward, European
Community Directive - The Provision of Services by Lawyers, 22 J. L. SOC'Y SCOT. 188 (1977)
(reviewing and evaluating the history and provisions of the Lawyers' Services Directive); Horst
Eidenmuller, Deregulating the Market for Legal Services in the European Community: Freedom of
Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services for EC Lawyers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 53
MOD. L. REV. 604 (1990); Elizabeth Freeman, A Common Market for Professionals?, 33 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 57 (1980) (discussing issues related to the right of establishment and the free
movement of services, particularly with regard to decisions of the European Court); Jacqueline
Friedlander, Note, Securing a Lawyer's Freedom of Establishment within the European Economic
Community, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 733 (1987) (discussing freedom of establishment problems);
Rainier Hofmann, 1992 and the Freedom of Establishment for Lawyers, INT'L LEGAL PROC., Mar.
1990, at 7 (defining and discussing lawyers' freedom of establishment); Julian Lonbay, Cross-Frontier
Provision of Services by Lawyers, 13 EUR. L. REV. 347 (1989) (examining European Court Case
427/85 (1988), Commission v. Germany, and discussing its impact on the cross-border practice of
law); Valerie Pease, Commission v. Germany, 22 INT'L LAW. 543 (1988); Rebecca M.M. Wallace,
Lawyers' Services with the Common Market, 121 SOLIC. J. 843 (23/30 Dec. 1977) (discussing the
Lawyer's Services Directive); Todd Michael Saunders, The EEC and the USA: Will the Gates be
Opened for American Law Firms in 1992, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 1919 (1989) (considering the
impact of EC restrictions on the operation of a U.S. firm within the community); Bernhard Schloh,
Freedom of Movement of Lawyers Within the European Economic Community, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 83 (1990) (discussing efforts of the EC to achieve free movement of lawyers within the EC);
Gregory Siskind, Freedom of Movement for Lawyers in the New Europe, 26 INT'L L. 899 (1992)
(examining the ability of the EC to integrate the legal professions of the Member States); D. B.
Walters, Uncertain Steps Towards a European Legal Profession, 3 EUR. L. REV. 265 (1978) (discussing
the shortcomings of the Lawyer's Services Directive); Daphne W. Gardiner, Note, The European
Community Directive Mandating Recognition of Post-Graduate Training: Are Borders Opening for
European Professionals?, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 1109 (1990) (examining the implementation of
the freedom of movement for professionals within the EC).
In addition to the above resources, there are several resources that were written before the CCBE
Code was adopted, but still are of interest. These materials discuss the substantive law of the
European Community regarding lawyers. As discussed in Part I1 of this article, which is forthcom-
ing, this substantive EC law is particularly relevant when trying to determine in which situations the
CCBE Code should be applied. This EC substantive law establishes the background against which
the CCBE Code jurisdictional provisions must be read. These resources discussing the EC
substantive law include, in addition to those already listed, the following: J.P. DE CRAYENCOUR, THE
PROFESSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: TOWARDS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND MUTUAL
RECOGNITION OF QUALIFICATIONS (1982); SERGE-PIERRE LAGUETTE, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1987); LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK (Alan N.
Katz ed., 1986); LINDA S. SPEDDING, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE EEC AND THE UNITED
STATES (1987); TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES (D. Camp-
bell ed., 1982) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE I]; John Boyd, Mutual Recognition of
Lawyers' Qualifications, 7 Bus. L. REV. 163 (1986); Julian Lonbay, Picking Over the Bones: Rights of
Establishment Reviewed, 16 EUR. L. REV. 507 (1991); Jeffrey Mendelsohn, Recent Development,
European Court of Justice: Paris Bar Rule Violates Right of Establishment, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 562
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ity, and structure of the CCBE Code. The fifth section of this article analyzes
the substantive provisions of the CCBE Code. After first listing the provi-
sions in the CCBE Code, the article discusses these provisions section-by-
section.
The first five sections of this article are thus static and historic in nature;
collectively, they afford a snapshot of the current state of the EC's ethics
regulations. In contrast to the first five sections, the final section of this
article offers a thesis as to why the EC's ethics code evolved as it did and why
it differs from the ABA's Model Rules in some instances, but not all. The
article then suggests that the substantive differences between the CCBE
Code and the Model Rules may be a function of different ways of looking at
the role of the lawyer.
Part II, which will appear in the next issue of this journal, reviews the
jurisdictional provisions of the CCBE Code and sets forth the situations in
which the CCBE Code might apply. (It also discusses the interplay between
the jurisdictional scope of the CCBE Code and the substantive law of the
European Community regulating lawyers.) Part II also gives a preview of a
possible future direction of the CCBE Code by discussing the methods for
enforcing the provisions of the CCBE Code, by looking at how the CCBE
Code has fared in the courts, and by highlighting efforts being taken by one
country - Austria - to respond to and implement the CCBE Code.
I. WHO PROMULGATED THE CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT AND WHY?
The CCBE Code is a product of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies
of the European Community, commonly known as the CCBE.5 The CCBE
was established in 1960 in order to study, consult, and provide representa-
tion with respect to the problems and opportunities for the legal profession
arising from the 1957 Treaty of Rome which created the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC or EC)6.The CCBE is officially recognized by the
(1985); Rolf Waegenbaur, Free Movement in the Professions: The New EEC Proposal on Professional
Qualifications, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 91 (1986); Heinz Weil, The Proposal for a Directive on the
Right of Establishment for Lawyers in the European Community, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 699 (1991-92);
Peter S. Wilson, Recent Development, EEC: Freedom to Provide Services for EEC Lawyers, 19 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 379 (1978).
5. The CCBE was formed in 1960 and is commonly known by this acronym. Although the original
name of this organization [Conseil des Barreaux de la Communaut6 EuropG] was changed in 1987 to
its current name [Commission Consultative des Barreaux de la Communaut6 Europ6] , the acronym
"CCBE" was officially retained and is used extensively. See CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3
at 2-6; Toulmin, supra note 4, at 673.
6. The preamble of the Nov. 2, 1990 revised constitution sets forth its purpose as follows:
WHEREAS the Treaty establishing the European Community confers upon members of
the legal profession in the member States certain rights and duties in the practice of their
profession which extend throughout the territory of the European Community;
WHEREAS it is in the interest of the public, of the administration of justice and of the
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European Community Commission as the representative and liaison body
in the European Community for the Bars and Law Societies of the Member
States.7 The CCBE thus represents some 300,000 lawyers in the Member
States, although individual lawyers, as yet, may not join the CCBE.8
Bars and Law Societies that the representative bodies of the profession through the
European Community should consult and act together in all matters concerning the
exercise of those rights and the performance of those duties;
WHEREAS in furtherance of those purposes representatives of the legal profession met
together in Brussels on 3 December 1960 to create and establish the Commission
Consultative des Barreaux de la Communaute Europeene (CCBE) to constitute and be the
body through which such consultation and co-operation should take place.
CCBE Const. pmbl.
The Constitution further elaborates on the objectives of the CCBE as follows:
The objects for which the CCBE is established are:
a) To act as a joint body on behalf of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community in all matters involving the application of Community Treaties and
Community Law to the legal profession.
b) To coordinate the views, policies and activities of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Community in their common dealings with the European institutions.
c) To constitute the forum within which the representatives of the Bars and Law
Societies may consult and work together.
d) To further the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome in its
application to the legal profession.
e) To act as the joint body of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community
in supervising the inter-state practice of the legal profession throughout the Commu-
nity.
f) To represent the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community in their
dealings with other organisations [sic] in the legal profession and with other authori-
ties and third parties.
g) To study and promote the study of all questions affecting the profession of lawyer
and to develop solutions designed to co-ordinate and harmonise the practice of that
profession.
Id. art. 1.03.
7. Id. art. 1.02; CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3 at 4-6; Goebel, Lawyers in the European
Community, supra note 4, at 601 (describing the CCBE as "an umbrella organization that groups
[together] all of the [European] Community national bar associations that represent lawyers
engaged in courtroom practice, as well as the law societies representing U.K. and Irish solicitors").
See also Stanley A. Crossick, The CCBE: An EEC Bar Association, 67 A.B.A. J. 170, 171 (1981)
(explaining the role of the CCBE); DE CRAYENCOUR, supra note 4, at 59 (stating that several of the
liason committees of the CCBE had been so involved in the work of the EC Commission that they
had almost become an extension of the Commission departments); Paula Donagby, European Bars in
Brussels, LAWS. EUR., September/October 1991, at 18-20 (focusing in particular on coordination
between national bars and the CCBE); Skarlatos, supra note 4, at 61 n.46; Piet Wackie-Eysten,
CCBE, LAWS. EUR., March/April 1991, at 20, 21 (explaining the history); John Toulmin, On the
CCBE After Lisbon, LAWS. EuR., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 8 (commenting on the special needs of the
National Bars and Law Societies of the EC and the CCBE's capacity to satisfy those needs).
The CCBE has consultative status with the European Commission. See Christina Morton, Update:
Establishment Directive, LAWS. EUR., September/October 1990, at 19; Crossick, supra, at 171.
8. Piet Wackie-Eysten, CEEB, LAWS. EUR., March/April 1991, at 20. For purposes of comparison,
it may be interesting to note that in 1992, the ABA, a voluntary organization, had approximately
382,000 lawyers. ABA MEMBER'S GUIDE v (1992-93). In 1990, there were 750,000 licensed lawyers in
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One of the CCBE's primary projects has been to draft a legal ethics code
which could be used when lawyers, like goods, begin to cross borders freely
within Europe.9 Although the substantive law of the European Community
has in fact addressed the issue of cross-border practice, this substantive law
has not addressed in detail the issue of which legal ethics provisions apply in
such a situation.1° Recognizing the need for specific guidance, the CCBE
decided to draft an ethics code in order to minimize the problems that could
occur when lawyers are subject to two different legal ethics codes - the
ethics code of the lawyer's own country and the ethics code of the country
where a lawyer is working."1
The work on the CCBE Code began in May 1982, after the CCBE
resolved at its meeting in Athens to "consider the feasibility of the establish-
ment of a code of conduct that would act as a set of principles to be
translated into a disciplinary code in each Member State."1 2 The first draft
was prepared by Lake Falconer, a Scottish solicitor, in March 1983.13 At the
CCBE's Plenary Session in Dublin, in April, 1983, a working group was
created to study the proposed draft.14 After meeting together, this Working
Group prepared a report which was considered at the November 1983
CCBE Plenary Session in Lisbon. 5 As a result of the presentation made by
the US. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (5th ed.
1991).
In 1988, the per capita rate of lawyers in the Member States of Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain
was approximately 1/1000. At the same time, the per capita rate of lawyers in Austria and France
was much lower, namely 1/3,500. See Karl Hempel, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit in den Europdischen
Gemeinschaften und die osterreichische Anwaltschaft, 9 ANWALTSBLATT- 487, 487 (1988) [hereinafter
ANW.BL.].
9. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 13; Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community,
supra note 4, at 601 ("The CCBE has produced one major achievement, the Code of Conduct, and is
actively working on another, the draft directive on establishment ...."); John Toulmin, 1992 Has
Arrived, LAws. EUR., January/February 1992, at 3 (providing background on the CCBE and its
projects).
10. See supra note 4 and articles cited therein, and Part II of this article, forthcoming (discussing
the substantive law of the European Community with respect to lawyers crossing borders).
11. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 13. See also Goebel, Lawyers in the European
Community, supra note 4, at 580 (noting that "[t]he CCBE Code should reduce appreciably the risk
of serious conflict between host and home state rules as applied to a lawyer providing cross-border
services").
12. See Toulmin, supra note 4, at 674.
13. Id.
14. See letter from Marcel Veroone, former President of the Working Group that drafted the
CCBE Code of Conduct, to Denis De Ricci, former President of the CCBE (July 21, 1992)
[hereinafter Veroone Letter]. The letter was sent as an enclosure to a letter from Denis De Ricci,
former President of the CCBE, to Laurel S. Terry, author (August 31, 1992) (Stephanie T. Farrior
trans.) (on file with the author) [hereinafter De Ricci Letter].
The author would like to express her deep appreciation to President De Ricci for his kindness in
gathering so much background information about the adoption of the CCBE Code of Conduct and to
Mr. Veroone for his detailed answers to her questions.
15. Veroone Letter, supra note 14. This working group consisted of Lake Falconer, President;
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the Working Group at this session, each country was asked to make their
reflections available in writing. Thus, for example, the French delegation
prepared a seven page document (plus appendices) in January 1984.16
Following submission of these comments, a third report concerning the new
code was presented by the Working Group President, Lake Falconer, at the
May 1984 Amsterdam Plenary Session of the CCBE.17 Shortly thereafter,
Lake Falconer resigned as President of the Working Group and Marcel
Veroone took over this position.' 8 Under the guidance of Marcel Veroone,
the Working Group began meeting approximately every two months. Mr.
Veroone asked each member of the group to choose a specific issue to study
and to gather information in consultation with other colleagues regarding
the existing law on that issue in all member states. After the information
was assembled, that member was responsible for formulating a proposal for
a rule for the new code.' 9 Among other resources, the Working Group
members consulted the codes that had been prepared by the International
Bar Association, the Union International des Avocats, and the American
Bar Association.2" Mr. Veroone prepared a report on the progress of the
work on January 9, 1985.
Thereafter, the Working Group put together proposals for the CCBE
Code over time, with the various sections and approaches being approved in
principle by the CCBE Plenary Body. Where the Working Group's research
revealed potentially divisive issues without a clear resolution, the issues
were brought before the CCBE as a whole."1 On several issues, the
comments at the CCBE Plenary Sessions led to changes by the Working
Group.22 During this period, there were some additions and changes to the
Working Group, but the membership remained relatively stable.23 During
Hamish Adamson, Secretary, from Great Britain; Paul Van Malleghem from Belgium; Rudiger
Zuck from Germany; Gianni Manca from Italy; Jose Coelho Ribeiro from Portugal; Marti Mingarro
from Spain; Joorgen Groonborg from Denmark; and Mr. Maheras from Greece. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. At this point, Herbert Verhheen from the Netherlands and Walter Semple from the
United Kingdom joined the group. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; accord Toulmin, supra note 4, at 674.
21. See De Ricci Letter, supra note 14; Veroone Letter, supra note 14.
22. See De Ricci Letter, supra note 14; Veroone Letter, supra note 14.
23. Veroone Letter, supra note 14. In the Spring of 1985, Louis Schiltz from Luxembourg and
Stelios Nestor and Nicholas Koutroubis from Greece joined the Working Group, and Heinz Weil
from Germany replaced Rudiger Zuck. In addition, John Cooke from Ireland joined the Working
Group upon completing his term as President of the CCBE itself. He was later replaced by Raymond
Monahan and then John Fish. Id.
In 1987, also added to the Working Group were Professor Panayotis Ladas from Greece, David
Anderson from the United Kingdom, Karl Hempel from Austria, Niels Fisch-Thomsen from
Denmark, and Arnaldo Bolla from Switzerland. Id.
Further, in 1987, Denis de Ricci was elected Vice President of the CCBE. Thereafter Marcel
[Vol. 7:1
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the final stage of the preparation, Gianni Manca of Italy took over the
leadership of the Working Group. 4
The completed CCBE Code was presented to the CCBE Plenary Session
in October 1988 in Strasbourg. CCBE President Denis De Ricci had
allotted four hours of discussion for consideration of the new code. How-
ever, the CCBE adopted the code in less than thirty minutes on a unani-
mous vote by the national delegates to the CCBE from the twelve EC
Member States. 26 The CCBE Code thus represents the culmination of more
than eight years of work by the Working Group and CCBE itself.
The CCBE Code, however, was not the first effort the CCBE had made at
addressing the topic of legal ethics. In 1977, the CCBE had issued a short
statement of ethics, which was entitled "The Declaration of Perugia on the
Principles of Professional Conduct of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Community., 27 It contained eight "Principles," most of which
were later incorporated into the CCBE Code.28 The Declaration of Perugia
can well be compared to the ABA's Canons of Legal Ethics. This Declara-
tion was
neither a full Code of Conduct, nor a binding set of rules, but a short
discourse on the function of a lawyer in society, on the nature of the rules
of professional conduct, and on some of the more important relevant
principles of ethics such as integrity, confidentiality, independence, the
corporate spirit of the profession and respect for the rules of other Bars
and Law Societies.
2 9
The CCBE concluded, however, that the general statements contained in
the Declaration of Perugia were insufficient to guide European lawyers
tackling the challenges of cross-border practice. This desire for more
detailed rules ultimately led to the formation of the Working Group
Veroone became head of the French Delegation and Gianni Manca from Italy took over as head of
the Working Group. De Ricci Letter, supra note 14.
24. De Ricci Letter, supra note 14; Veroone Letter, supra note 14.
25. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 13; Toulmin, supra 4, at 673; De Ricci Letter, supra
note 14; Veroone Letter, supra note 14.
26. De Ricci Letter, supra note 14. Although each Member State has one delegation in the CCBE
and thus one vote, the delegation consists of three to six individuals appointed by the various Bars
and Law Societies within the Member States. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 9.
27. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 10-12.
28. Compare THE DECLARATION OF PERUGIA ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1977) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
PERUGIA] with CCBE CODE. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 10-12.
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described above.3" The recently-issued Cross Border Practice Compendium
(CCBE Compendium) justified the need for a more detailed code as follows:
Work towards an agreed Code was undertaken [by the CCBE] not as a
pious exercise but as a useful convenience. Agreement on a single Code
was seen as a practical damage limitation exercise. The alternative to
adopting one Code was the possibility of having to recognise up to
fourteen slightly or distinctly different Codes - written or unwritten -
the details of which might be only partially known to or understood by
each lawyer. The necessity for compliance with two, or more, Codes - the
exposure to the requirements of double or multiple deontology - could
be largely removed by the adoption of a common Code. In such circum-
stances the usefulness of a single agreed Code must be similar to that of a
common set of weights and measures.
3'
In short, lawyers, selected by the bar associations in their respective
countries, promulgated the CCBE Code to address some of the issues likely
to occur in the EC when lawyers in one Member State begin practicing law
in another Member State.
II. To WHOM DOES THE CCBE CODE APPLY?
Because the United States has only one category of legal professional -
the lawyer - the Model Rules are able to use the term "lawyer" and by that
term include such diverse professionals as prosecutors, criminal defense
attorneys, tax advisors, public interest lawyers, and house counsel. In
European countries, however, one cannot simply use the term "lawyer" and
by this term refer to the diverse professionals listed above. European
countries do not have a single unified legal profession as does the United
States.32 In Austria, for example, there are six distinct careers which require
legal education as a prerequisite and six different German words which are
used to refer to these different professional careers. 33 These careers include
30. See De Ricci Letter, supra note 14; accord CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 13
(referring to inadequacies of the Declaration of Perugia); Karl Hempel, Der CCBE-Standesrechtsko-
dex und das 6sterreichische anwaltliche Standesrecht, ANw.BL., 1991/4, at 209; cf. Xavier Normand-
Bodard, EC Integration - Size is Not Important, LAWS. EUR., September/October 1990, at 5
(referring to the CCBE Code and stating "[w]ith the continuous growth of industrial, commercial
and personal contacts throughout the EC, all lawyers (from sole practitioners to large firms) have a
clear interest in drawing up common codes of conduct and practice rules").
31. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 13.
32. See generally HANDBOOKS, reprinted in CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4 (listing of ethics
codes from individual EC Member and Observer States) [hereinafter HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER
STATES or HANDBOOKS - EC OBSERVER STATES]; SPEDDING, supra note 4, at 87.
33. The six professions in Austria for which legal education is required are:
- Rechtsanwalt (attorney)
- Notar (notary public)
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the positions of prosecutor, judge, private practitioner, a government
employee qualified to do legal work, and a tax lawyer. And, as is true in
several European countries, under the current law, a person serving as a
"corporate" or "house" counsel may not be regulated as a legal profes-
sional.34 Moreover, the "members of the various professions consider
themselves and are, in fact and by law, different from the others."35 As one
American author recently commented, the incomplete institutionalization
of law as a profession in European nations comes as a shock to many
Americans.36 Therefore, one cannot answer the question "to whom does
the CCBE Code apply?" by merely stating that it applies to "lawyers."
Rather, one must specify exactly the legal professionals in each country to
whom the CCBE applies. The CCBE Code does this in Rule 1.4 by defining
the type of "lawyer" in each country to whom it applies.
III. WHAT Is THE BINDING FORCE OF THE CCBE CODE?
The adoption of the CCBE Code by the CCBE could not, by itself, make
the CCBE Code binding in each of the EC Member States. The CCBE is not
an institution of the European Community, nor does it have decision-
making power for the EC.3 7 Rather, the CCBE is the official liaison to the
- Steuerberater-Wirtschaftstreuhander (tax consultant, tax attorney)
- Staatsanwalt (public prosecutor)
- Richter (judge); and
- Rechtskundige Beamte (public employees qualified for legal work).
Eugen Salpius, Austria, in TRANSNATATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE I, supra note 4, at 45.
34. The nature of the legal professions in Austria is beyond the scope of this article. In brief,
however, the Austrian Rechisanwalt is most equivalent to the United States privately-retained
lawyer. (The term "Rechtsanwalt" would not include house counsel or lawyers employed by a single
client.) The Rechtsanwalt performs both advisory and advocacy functions and can appear in both
civil and criminal trials. The Notar in Austria plays a very different role than the notary republic in
the United States. To become a Notar in Austria, one must be nominated by the Minister of Justice.
Positions are limited, prestige and fees are high, and competition is keen. Id. at 45-47.
Among other legal work, some legal operations in Austria, such as forming certain corporations,
may not be done without a Notar's assistance. Id. at 46. Judges (or Richter) in Austria, as in much of
Europe, select a "Judge's track" after law school and are trained, examined, and apprenticed for
this position. A law student typically selects one of these tracks after completing his law training. In
contrast to the United States, it is extremely unlikely that after having selected one of these
particular professions, a person will later switch tracks. Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 45.
36. See Martin Shapiro, Lawyers, Corporations and Knowledge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 696 (1990)
(reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL AND PHILIP S. C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (1988) and RICHARD L.
ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988)).
37. For background on the EC institutions and decisionmaking power, see generally G. BERMAN ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1973) (providing basic information
about the EC, "its structure, goals, fields of action, achievements and aspirations"); P. J. G.
KAPTEYN & PIETER VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (Lawrence W.
Gormley ed., 1989) (explaining the impact of the Single European Act and its relationship with the
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European Community institutions, representing the interests of the lawyers
in the EC Member States.3 8 Thus, just as the ABA had no formal power to
compel the adoption of the Model Rules, the CCBE has no official power to
create binding requirements.39
As a practical matter, however, the CCBE Code is now binding. Section
1.3.2 of the CCBE Code proposed that the "rules codified in the following
articles. . . be adopted as enforceable rules as soon as possible in accor-
dance with national or Community procedures in relation to the cross-
border activities of the lawyer in the European Community.. . .,,40 And,
indeed, the CCBE has been more successful with respect to acceptance of
original treaties); DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC (3d ed.
1992) (explaining and examining the substantive law of the European Communities). For a non-
academic but excellent introduction to the European Community in general and the issues raised by
the Maastricht Treaty in particular, see RICHARD OWENS & MICHAEL DYNES, THE TIMES GUIDE TO
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1992).
As these resources explain, there are in fact three "European Communities," not one. Three
separate initiating treaties established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); and the European Economic Community (EEC).
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the EEC, together with the subsequent law relating to the
EEC is typically what is being referred to when the shorthand term "European Community" or
"EC" is used.
The four institutions of the EC are the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the European
Commission, and the European Court of Justice. A detailed description of the responsibilities of
these four institutions is not possible here. Other than the European Court of Justice, which
functions similarly to what an American might expect, these other institutions are organized and
function in ways very different than what their names or these shorthand reference might suggest.
Indeed, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the European Parliament share the political
tasks of legislating and administering Community law. BERMAN, supra, at 50.
38. See Crossick, supra note 7, at 170-71.
The CCBE may have competition, however, in its efforts to be the representative institution of
European lawyers. On May 23, 1992, the Federation of European Bars (Federation des Barreaux
d'Europe) was formed. The Federation is open to all the Bars in Europe, including local as well as
national Bars. There were approximately 50 members of the Federation in the beginning of 1992.
See Eugenio Gay Montalvo & Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, On the Newly Established Federation of
European Bars, LAWS. EUR., July/August 1992, at 3. Some of the aims of the Federation are "to
promote the harmonisation of codes of conduct" and "to contribute to improvements in profes-
sional rules." Id. In addition to the new Federation, the International Bar Association (IBA) also
has a code of ethics and is interested in participating in the regulation of foreign (cross-border)
practice. See generally Sir Thomas Lund, Foreign Practice, A.B.A. J., October 1973, at 1154
(reviewing the IBA conference and its proceedings).
39. Accord Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 4, at 601. The binding
requirements in the EC consist of: the initial Treaty provisions; subsequent agreements signed by
the 12 Member States, such as the single European Act which created what we now refer to as
"1992"; regulations, which are general rules binding in all Member States without further formality;
directives, which are binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed as to the result to be
achieved, but which leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods; and
decisions, which are addressed to either Member States or individual citizens and are binding upon
those to whom they are addressed. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
[hereinafter EEC TREATY] art. 189; see CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 2, at 3, 15.
40. CCBE CODE Rule 1.3.2.
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its Code of Conduct than has the ABA with its Model Rules. In most, if not
all, of the Member States, the professional body responsible for establishing
lawyer ethics codes and regulations has adopted the CCBE Code and
specified that it will govern the cross-border practice of the designated legal
professionals.4
Moreover, the CCBE Code now governs cross-border practice in certain
European countries which are not currently members of the EC. The CCBE
has given the title "Observer Status" to seven European countries, most of
which have petitioned to join the EC.42 These Observer States also have
representatives in the CCBE. The Observer State Delegations are permit-
ted to participate fully in discussions and debate but are non-voting
41. The issue of exactly which Member States have adopted the CCBE Code has been difficult to
resolve. Several sources indicate that all Member States have adopted the CCBE Code. See CCBE
COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 13-14; accord letter from Treaty Webster, CCBE Director
General, to Laurel Terry, author (June 18, 1992)("You can safely say that all of the countries have
accepted the Code, . . . as it has in fact been adopted in all of the Observer countries as well as the
Twelve [Member States].") See also Toulmin, supra note 4, at 673 n.2 (commenting that "the Code
has been adopted in different ways in the Member States," and citing the method of adoption in
England and Wales).
On the other hand, other sources have indicacted that not all Member States have adopted the
CCBE Code. See ADAMSON, supra note 4, at 67, 69 (explaining why Germany had not yet adopted the
CCBE Code as a binding document). Representatives from certain Member States have advised the
author of their country's adoption of the CCBE Code. Letter from Hamish Adamson, U.K.
Delegation to the CCBE, to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 13, 1992); letter from Werner Daem,
Director General, Belgium National Bar, to Laurel S. Terry, author, (July 23, 1992); letter from
Lambert H. Dupong, Dupong and Associates, to Laurel S. Terry, author (Sept. 22, 1992); letter
from Dr. Michael Gout, French Delegation to the CCBE, to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 10, 1992);
letter from Mogens Holm, Danish Bar and Law Society, to Laurel S. Terry, author (Aug. 19, 1992);
letter from Luis Marti Mingarro, Secretary General, Spanish Bar Association, to Laurel S. Terry,
author (July 14, 1992) (all letters on file with the author).
The Director of the CCBE, as well as the individuals listed above, has indicated that the CCBE
Code has been adopted in the Member State(s) by an organization that has the power to regulate the
designated legal professionals. The next question obviously is why these organizations have the
power and authority to regulate these lawyers. It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate
each of the CCBE Member and Observer States for the source of law that gives to the adopting
organization the power to regulate their lawyers. It is therefore assumed that these organizations
indeed do have the power to adopt the CCBE Code and thereby make it enforceable within that
country.
See infra note 70 (listing the specific legal professionals within each Member State to which the
CCBE Code applies).
42. By 1992, there were seven Observer States: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. See CCBE, INFORMATION BROCHURE (1992); Toulmin, supra
note 4, at 674 n.5 (noting that Czechoslovakia was given Observer Status in the CCBE at the Plenary
Session of the CCBE held in Hague on October 25, 1991). In 1993, the CCBE voted to give Iceland
and Hungary observer status. Update, LAWS. EUR., May 1993, at 10. The CCBE also determined that
once the European Economic Area comes into force, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and
Austria will become Member States, rather than Observer States. Id. Those states that have
petitioned to join the EC include Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Turkey. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Davidson, E~ropean Community Academic Affairs
(Dec. 18, 1992).
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members.43 By 1992, the CCBE Code had been adopted in six of the then
seven officially recognized Observer States, and adoption was pending in
the seventh Observer State, Czechoslovakia, at the time it split into the
Czech and Slovak Republics."
In addition to the CCBE Code, the CCBE has issued an Explanatory
Memorandum and Commentary on the CCBE Code of Conduct for Lawyers in
the European Community (CCBE Explanatory Memorandum).45 The first
paragraph of the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum explains that it has not
been officially adopted and that it was prepared by the CCBE Deontology
Working Party which was responsible for the drafting of the CCBE Code.46
The memorandum seeks to "explain the origin of the provisions of the
Code, to illustrate the problems which they are designed to resolve,
particularly in relation to cross-border activities, and to provide assistance
to the competent authorities in the Member States in the application of the
43. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 10-12.
44. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 14; see also letter from Dr. Karel Cermak,
President, Czech Bar Association, to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 14, 1992); letter from Lars
Bentelius, Swedish Bar Association, to Laurel S. Terry, author (Sept. 11, 1992); letter from Max P.
Oesch, Secretary General, Swiss Bar Association, to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 8, 1992); letter
from Wenche Siewers, Juridisk Sekretaer, Norwegian Bar Association, to Laurel S. Terry, author
(July 10, 1992); letter from Marjukka Silolahti, Deputy Secretary General, Finnish Bar Association,
to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 28, 1992) (all letters on file with the author).
At the celebration of the 30th year of the founding of the CCBE, held in Basel on November 1,
1990, representatives of the six Observer States signed agreements that permit the use of the CCBE
Code and the international proof of lawyer identity. See Hempel, supra note 30, at 210.
On October 25, 1991, at an annual meeting of the Plenary Session of the CCBE, five of the then six
Observer States, namely Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Norway, and Austria, signed an agreement
that the CCBE Code would apply to cross-border practice among the Observer States. See Dr. Georg
Frieders, Erweiterung des Geltungsbereiches des CCBE-Standesrechtskodex bei entsprechender Unterw-
erfungserklarung, 1 ANw.BL. 24 (1992). This Agreement supplements the November 1, 1990
Agreement in which all six of these Observer States agreed that the CCBE Code would apply to cross
border practice involving lawyers from that Observer State and lawyers from an EC Member State.
Id. Cyprus is expected to sign the October 25, 1991 agreement at a later date. It is not clear what will
happen to the seventh Observer State, Czechoslovakia, now that it has split into the separate
countries of the Czech and Slovak Republics.
45. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND COMMENTARY ON THE CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY [hereinafter CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM], re-
printed in CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 33; see infra Appendix C, where the CCBE
Explanatory Memorandum has been reproduced in its entirity.
46. Id. The CCBE Deontology Working Group is a subsidiary committee of the CCBE. The
official delegations to the CCBE from the twelve EC Member States meet in plenary session twice a
year. According to the CCBE Compendium, however, the work of the CCBE is accomplished not
only by means of the bi-annual Plenary Sessions, but through the standing committees, working
groups, and specialist committees, among others. As of October 1992, the CCBE had five working
groups, as follows: Deontology, Future of the Profession, Future Role and Work of the CCBE,
Relations with the Bars of East Europe, and Social Security Provisions. In addition, many of these
working groups have subsidiary committees, addressing topics such as advertising, legal fees, legal
audits, and multinational partnerships. For an excellent overview of the bureaucracy of the CCBE,
see generally CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 9-32.
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code."4 7 The memorandum continues, however, by stating that it is not
intended to have any binding force in the interpretation of the code. Thus,
the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum could be analogized to the comments
which accompany the Model Rules.
The CCBE Code was originally prepared in English and French. Transla-
tions into other Community languages are being or have been prepared
under the authority of the National Delegations concerned. Thus, the
German version was recently published after having been agreed to by the
representatives from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.48 The CCBE
Code also has been formally deposited with the European Commission.49
IV. WHAT TYPE OF CODE IS THE CCBE CODE?
The CCBE Code uses a structure not unlike that of the Model Rules. The
CCBE Code consists of black letter rules which set forth the expected
conduct for lawyers. These rules are mandatory requirements, similar to the
Model Rules, as opposed to the aspirational requirements exemplified by the
Ethical Considerations or "EC's" of the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (Model Code).50 As stated in Rule 1.2.1 of the CCBE Code, which
explains the nature of its Rules of Professional Conduct, "[t]he failure of
the lawyer to observe these rules must in the last resort result in a
disciplinary sanction. 51
Although the CCBE Code might be described as similar to the Model
Rules in that it contains black letter rules, it is fair to say that an American
reader would find the CCBE Code "leaner" than the Model Rules. This
leanness is understandable. It is a truism that American lawyers have a
different style of lawyering than European lawyers; Americans are accus-
47. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45.
48. The German version of the CCBE Code was prepared by Heinz Weil, a German Rechtsanwalt
with offices in Paris and Duesseldorf. This version was agreed to by representatives of the
German-speaking section of Belgium and the Observer States Austria and Switzerland. This
German version was officially published in Austria. STANDESREGELN DER RECHTSANWALTE DER
EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT, reprinted in ANw.BL., 1991/4, at 210, 213-218.
49. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch 3, at 16-18. As a result of this "formal deposit," one can
conclude that the European Commission has official knowledge of the existence of the CCBE Code.
The presentation ceremony, however, did not confer a legally binding status on the CCBE Code or
indeed have any binding legal effect. See Piet Wackie-Eysten, Establishment Directive, Where to
Now?, LAWS. EUR., May/June 1991, at 6 ("In January 1989 [the CCBE Code] was presented to the
European Commission at a short ceremony in Brussels ....").
50. The Ethical Considerations provide lawyers with interpretive guidance. The Model Code
provides, "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
51. CCBE CODE Rule 1.2.1. (The method of enforcing the CCBE Code through disciplinary
proceedings is discussed in Part I1 of this article, forthcoming.) In short, the CCBE has not as yet
established a separate procedure for disciplining lawyers who violate the CCBE Code.
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tomed to more detail and specification than often is used in Europe.52
Europeans have revealed a concern to avoid overly-detailed provisions.
Thus, for example, in explaining the need for a code of conduct, the CCBE
Compendium began by recognizing the existence of those who believe that a
sufficient code is one that states: "Thou shalt at all times act in the client's
best interest."53 The CCBE Compendium justified the more detailed ap-
proach on the basis of the more complex circumstances of contemporary
practice; very simple codes were no longer adequate.54 However, although
the CCBE Compendium acknowledged the need for detailed provisions, it
cautioned that " '[w]e have to be sure that in the end we are sustained by
principle and not shackled by precedent' - nor by endless regulations.,
55
While the CCBE opted for a relatively detailed black-letter code, the
CCBE Compendium also perceived weaknesses in such an approach:
Codes can create an environment in which certain standards are
encouraged. Codes themselves, however, have limitations. They have
more often a dissuasive effect than a positive impetus. They help us to
avoid rather than to fulfill. They are attempts to capture on paper an
approved pattern of behavior, a desired moral climate, an answer to all
questions of conduct - which cannot be adequately captured on paper.
Codes are helpful only if the value judgements on which they rest are
sound, the distinctions which they make are clear and the means by which
they are applied are effective.
56
The concerns expressed in the CCBE Compendium about the nature and
shape of the CCBE Code mirror many of the same concerns that appeared
in the United States revolving around whether the approach of the Model
Rules should be used in place of the established Model Code approach-
concerns about the appropriate degree of specificity and whether the bar
would be better guided by enforceable rules, necessarily reflecting the
lowest common denominator, or by aspirational, yet largely unenforceable,
rules.
52. Goebel, Professional Qualification, supra note 4, at 445-446; Louis-Henri Verbeke, Brussels:
What's the Crack, Jacques, LAWS. EUR., January/February 1992, at 13, 17 (noting the issue European
firms are facing of whether to practice "a la New Yorkaise").
53. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 10-12.
54. "The legal profession has from earliest times recognised the need to apply ethical principles
to professional practice and has made efforts to do so over many centuries. Thus rudimentary rules
met simpler circumstances, more refined and detailed rules now meet more complex circumstances."
CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 9.
55. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 14 (citation omitted).
56. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 14.
57. For an overview of the debate regarding the best format, see AM. BAR ASS'N, THE LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3-4 (1987). See also MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 16-18 (noting
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE CCBE
CODE OF CONDUCT
Creating a common code of legal ethics for all the diverse countries in the
European community is no small undertaking. Certainly, there are many
similarities among the lawyers and legal ethics rules in Europe.5" However,
even without including the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in
the calculus (and the divergent outlooks of the civil law and common law
systems), significant differences persist among the legal professions and
legal ethics rules of Continental Europe.59 Indeed, one of the difficulties is
in recognizing the situations in which such rules variations might exist! 60
Given the varied languages, histories, and cultures of the EC Member
States, whose differences are much greater than the differences among the
American States, these differences in legal ethics rules are not surprising.
Indeed, one might reach the opposite conclusion - despite the common
Roman roots of many of the EC Member States, it is nevertheless amazing
Professor Lon Fuller's comparison between an approach involving the "morality of duty" (minimum
standards) and the "morality of aspiration").
58. See generally HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 32. For example, a similarity
exists between the conflict of interest rules of the European countries. The conflict rule in Belgium
states:
The lawyer is not permitted to act for two or more clients whose interests conflict, or in
circumstances in which the interests of two or more clients are perceived as developing
towards the probability of conflicts.
This rule also applies where ... the lawyer already has 'inside knowledge,' the use of which
might entail breach of confidentiality.
CODE OF CONDUCT - BELGIUM Rule 8.6, reprinted in HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES, supra
note 32. This language is also used in the conflict rules of Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and
Spain. CODE OF CONDUCT - DENMARK Rule 8.6, reprinted in HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES,
supra note 32; CODE OF CONDUCT - GREECE Rule 8.6, reprinted in HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER
STATES, supra note 32; CODE OF CONDUCT - THE NETHERLANDS Rule 8.6, reprinted in HANDBOOKS
- EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 32; CODE OF CONDUCT - SPAIN Rule 8.6, reprinted in
HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 32. See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the CCBE CODE Rule 3.2 (discussing the Code's conflict rule).
59. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 4, at 9. The compendium explains that when differences
occur, they may give rise to complex difficulties and misunderstandings among colleagues. In the
past, when practice within the EC was conducted mostly within territorial borders, this divergence
was seldom of practical importance. But as cross-border practice develops and will develop both in
Europe and on an international scale, it is becoming more essential to work towards a wider
consensus. The hope is that there will be a growth of increased trust, closer alignment of standards,
and closer co-operation. Id., ch. 4, at 10-12. For a comparison between the CCBE Code and the
Model Rules, see infra Part VI.
60. I was quite surprised, for example, to learn that in France and six other countries in the EC,
pursuant to the relevant legal privilege principles, if a lawyer indicates that the lawyer's correspon-
dence with another lawyer is to be treated as confidential, the recipient lawyer may not show the
letter to the recipient lawyer's own client! See CCBE CODE Rule 5.3; CCBE EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 5.3 cmt. See discussion infra notes 162-166 and accompanying
text.
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the legal ethics codes of these European countries have developed so
similarly. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the CCBE Code contains
many areas where agreement and consensus were noted and other areas
where the drafters could only note disagreement without resolving that
disagreement. As a result, in some areas, the CCBE Code has attempted to
eliminate what it refers to as "double deontology" (i.e., conflicting provi-
sions) without providing a "single deontology" (i.e., without adopting a
particular substantive position). In other words, in certain places, the CCBE
Code might be more accurately described as a "conflicts of law" code,
stating which state's ethics rules to use, rather than a universally acceptable
"legal ethics" code.
This section of the article, which discusses the substantive content of the
CCBE Code, is divided into three subsections. The first subsection offers a
brief overview of the topics contained within the CCBE Code. The second
subsection discusses the content of the substantive provisions in the CCBE
Code. The third subsection compares certain Model Rules and CCBE Code
provisions and suggests that their differences may reflect a different way of
conceptualizing the role of the lawyer.
A. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE CCBE CODE
The provisions in the CCBE Code are separated into five major sections:
(1) Preamble, (2) General Principles, (3) Relations with Clients, (4) Rela-
tions with the Courts, and (5) Relations between Lawyers. Under these five
general headings are thirty-five rules, many of which have subsections.61
B. A DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CCBE CODE
One of the first things an American reader must understand about the
CCBE Code is that it is not a pure substantive legal ethics code in the same
tradition as the Model Rules. The Model Rules provides substantive provi-
sions defining what a lawyer can and cannot do for almost all of its covered
topics.62 In contrast, as noted earlier, the CCBE Code might be described as
both a "legal ethics" code and a "conflicts of law" code. The CCBE Code is
61. See infra Appendix B, where the code has been reproduced in its entirety.
62. Some of the Model Rules, however, do not set forth their own substantive standards, but
instead require the lawyer to comply with the existing substantive law. For instance, Rule 3.5,
regulating "Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal," provides that "[a] lawyer shall not: (a) seek
to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; [or] (b)
communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law." MODEL RULES Rule
3.5(a)-(b).
Despite this occasional absence of independent substantive standards, I believe it is fair to say
that the ABA Model Rules almost uniformly provide substantive standards for the legal ethics issues
and thus can be properly described as a "legal ethics" code.
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a "legal ethics" code because for some topics the CCBE Code provides
substantive legal ethics provisions. For other topics, however, the CCBE
Code does not provide a substantive provision but instead merely tells a
lawyer which state's legal ethics rules the lawyers should use. Such provi-
sions function as "conflicts of law" provisions.
This discussion of the provisions of the CCBE Code uses an organization
which follows the headings used in the CCBE Code since these topics are
thematically related. It does not use an organization based on the nature of
the provision (which would group together all the "conflicts of law"-type
provisions). The discussion of each rule, however, does note whether a rule
has substantive content and the nature of that content or whether a rule is a
"conflicts of law"-type provision which merely states whose substantive rule
the lawyer should use.
1. The "Preamble" of the CCBE Code of Conduct
The CCBE Code begins with a "Preamble," which consists of six rules,
several of which have subsections. Starting in reverse order, Rule 1.6 is the
"definitions" section of the CCBE Code and is noticeably shorter than the
definitions section in the Model Rules.6 3 Indeed, the CCBE Code defines
only three terms: "Home Member State," "Host Member State," and
"Competent Authority." 64 In contrast to the Model Rules, which offer a
definition of words whose meanings have been the topic of considerable
debate (e.g., "knowingly," "reasonable belief," "consultation"), 65 none of
the three definitions in the CCBE Code purports to resolve a particularly
thorny philosophical debate.
Rules 1.5 and 1.4, which delineate the professionals to whom the CCBE
Code is applicable and the situations to which it applies, have no direct
counterpart in the Model Rules. As explained below, the need for these
CCBE Code provisions stems from the different context in which the CCBE
Code must operate. Rule 1.5 states the situations to which the CCBE Code
was intended to apply. Because the CCBE Code was not designed to
regulate all the activities of the "lawyers" in the states adopting it, Rule 1.5
was necessary. This rule specifies that the CCBE Code was intended to
apply to only the "cross-border activities of lawyers.",
66
Rule 1.4 of the CCBE Code does not define the situations to which the
CCBE Code applies, but rather the individuals to whom it applies.67 As
63. Compare CCBE CODE Rule 1.6 with MODEL RULES terminology.
64, CCBE CODE Rule 1.6.
65. MODEL RULES terminology.
66. CCBE CODE Rule 1.5. The difficult jurisdictional issues of when the CCBE Code applies are
discussed at length in Part II of this article, forthcoming.
67. CCBE CODE Rule 1.4.
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explained ealier, because European countries do not have a unified legal
profession as does the United States, Rule 1.4 serves a necessary role by
defining the type of "lawyer" in each country to which it applies.
Most surprising to an American, house counsel in many instances are not
covered by the listing of professionals in CCBE Rule 1.4. Many European
countries take the position that an employed lawyer, who by definition has
only one client, cannot maintain the required independent professional
judgment and is, in essence, in a permanent conflict of interest situation.68
These countries therefore specifically exclude employed lawyers or house
counsel from their definition of lawyer.69 The CCBE Code has not overrid-
den this judgment by the Member States as to who constitutes a lawyer.
Instead, the category of lawyer authorized in the Member States was merely
incorporated by reference .'o
Rule 1.3 is used to establish "The Purpose of the Code." The first
subsection of Rule 1.3 explains the background of the CCBE Code.7" In the
second subsection, the CCBE identified its intentions for the CCBE Code,
which were that the rules therein:
- be recognised at the present time as the expression of a consensus of all
the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community;
68. Crossick, supra note 7, at 171. "The practicing legal profession does not include the house
attorney in Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg, where they cannot be members of the bar.
Indeed, these countries do not permit lawyers to be employed, even by other lawyers. Employment is
regarded as incompatible with the independence of the lawyer." Id. Cf. DE CRAYENCOUR, supra note
4, at 20-21 (discussing "independence [as] one of the characteristic features of the professions...").
69. Countries that specifically exclude employed lawyers or house counsel from their definition of
lawyer include Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Austria, Cyprus, and Sweden. See HANDBOOKS,
supra note 32 (discussing Rule 2.2 on incompatible occupations).
70. CCBE CODE Rule 1.4. "The following rules shall apply to lawyers of the European
Community as they are defined by the Directive 77/249 of 22nd March 1977." Id. Article 1, Section 2
of this Directive states:














Council Directive 77/249, art. 1, § 2, 1977 O.J. (L 78) 17, reprinted in CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note
4, ch. 5, at 38-39.
71. CCBE CODE Rule 1.3.1.
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- be adopted as enforceable rules as soon as possible in accordance with
the national or Community procedures in relation to the cross-border
activities of the lawyer in the European Community;
- be taken into account in all revisions of national rules of deontology or
professional practice with a view to their progressive harmonisation.
7 2
The Model Rules do not have a direct counterpart to Rule 1.3. Instead, the
ABA has addressed the purpose of the Model Rules in the its "Scope"
section.7 3
An additional rule of the "Preamble" section of the CCBE Code is Rule
1.2, which sets forth "The Nature of Rules of Professional Conduct., 74 As
explained in the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum, this rule consists of a
restatement of principles contained in the Declaration of Perugia, which was
the CCBE's first effort at a code of ethics.75 The first subsection corresponds
in large part to material contained in the "Scope" section of the Model
Rules: it explains the role of the CCBE Code as a basis for discipline while
recognizing that enforcement must rely on a lawyer's willing acceptance of
the rules. 76 The second subsection acknowledges that while "particular
rules of each Bar or Law Society arise from its own traditions. . . ., [they]
nevertheless are based on the same values."77
72. CCBE CODE Rule 1.3.2. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
extent to which the CCBE Code has been adopted within the Member States as an enforceable rule.
For a discussion of the extent to which at least one CCBE country has taken the CCBE Code into
account in its revisions of its national rules of deontology or professional practice, see Part I1 of this
article, forthcoming.
73. MODEL RULES scope.
74. CCBE CODE Rule 1.2. See also Lund, supra note 38 (recounting the Int'l Bar Ass'n's
recommendations regarding foreign (cross-border) practice).
75. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 1.2 cmt.
76. CCBE CODE Rule 1.2.1 provides as follows:
Rules of professional conduct are designed through their willing acceptance by those to
whom they apply to ensure the proper performance by the lawyer of a function which is
recognised as essential in all civilised societies. The failure of the lawyer to observe these
rules must in the last resort result in a disciplinary sanction.
CCBE CODE Rule 1.2.1.
The "Scope" section of the Model Rules includes the following language:
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and
public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceed-
ings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.
The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for
invoking the disciplinary process.
MODEL RULES scope.
77. CCBE CODE Rule 1.2.2.
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Rule 1.1, like Rule 1.2, is a reaffirmation of principles originally ham-
mered out in the context of the Declaration of Perugia.78 This rule, which
explains "The Function of the Lawyer in Society," reflects many of the
principles contained in the "Preamble" to the Model Rules. CCBE Rule 1.1
states:
In a society founded on respect for the rule of law the lawyer fulfills a
special role. His duties do not begin and end with the faithful perfor-
mance of what he is instructed to do so far as the law permits. A lawyer
must serve the interests of justice as well as those whose rights and
liberties he is trusted to assert and defend and it is his duty not only to
plead his client's cause but to be his adviser.
A lawyer's function therefore lays on him a variety of legal and moral
obligations (sometimes appearing to be in conflict with each other)
towards:
- the client;
- the courts and other authorities before whom the lawyer pleads his
client's cause or acts on his behalf;
- the legal profession in general and each fellow member of it in
particular; and
- the public for whom the existence of a free and independent profes-
sion, bound together by respect for rules made by the profession itself, is
an essential means of safeguarding human rights in face of the power of
the state and other interests in society.
79
Rule 1.1 thus acknowledges the same conflicting obligations identified in
the Model Rules.80
In sum, the rules contained in the "Preamble" section of the CCBE Code
could properly be described as true "legal ethics code" provisions rather
78. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 1.1 cmt.
79. CCBE CODE Rule 1.1.
80. The "Preamble" section of the Model Rules similarly recognizes the multiple roles of the
lawyer as both a representative of, and adviser to, the client. It provides that "[a]s a representative
of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an
informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system." MODEL RULES pmbl. The section also recognizes that a lawyer owes obligations
to a variety of individuals and that these obligations can sometimes appear to be in conflict with one
another. It states, "[i]n the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsi-
bilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person
while earning a satisfactory living." Id. Accord MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 22 ("Another
useful way to approach these problems is to recognize that in an important sense, any Code of
Professional Responsibility or set of Model Rules is an attempt to accommodate at least five
interests. The interests are those of (1) lawyers as individuals, (2) lawyers in their relationships with
each other, (3) clients, (4) the public, and (5) the legal system.").
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than "conflicts of law" provisions. Rules 1.1 and 1.2 state general principles,
capable of application in all circumstances. Rules 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 have been
developed specifically for the cross-border practice situations, but neverthe-
less have substantive content. With the exception of Rule 1.4, which permits
the continued exclusion of "house counsel" from the lawyers to whom the
CCBE Code applies, none of these rules should appear particularly surpris-
ing to an American lawyer.
2. The "General Principles" in the CCBE Code
The "General Principles" section of the CCBE Code contains seven rules,
many of which have subsections. These seven "General Principles" address
a lawyer's obligations with respect to: 1) independence, 2) trust and
personal integrity, 3) confidentiality, 4) respect for the rules of other Bars
and Law Societies, 5) incompatible occupations, 6) personal publicity
[advertising], and 7) the predominance of the client's interests.
The first five of the seven principles listed above appear to be codifica-
tions of principles that were originally set forth in the 1977 Declaration of
Perugia.8 These first five "General Principles" are not verbatim adoptions
but nevertheless demonstrate that the two documents are closely related.
Much of the language in the "General Principles" section of the CCBE
Code is lifted from the Declaration of Perugia with only small modifica-
tions.82 The last two of these "General Principles," however, have no
counterparts in the Declaration of Perugia.
81. The Declaration of Perugia was the CCBE's predecessor document to the CCBE Code and
contained eight principles of "professional conduct of the bars and law societies of the European
Community." DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, pmbl. See also supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Declaration of Perugia. The Declaration is available
directly from the CCBE. See supra note 4 for correspondence information.
82. I have listed the Declaration of Perugia antecedents of these provisions because I consider this
information to be in the nature of legislative history which might be important if a court or other
body ever had to interpret such a provision or, more importantly, decide between seemingly
competing provisions. On the one hand, the fact that a rule had its antecedents in the ealier, and
much shorter Declaration of Perugia might suggest the priority or fundamental importance of such a
rule. On the other hand, because the CCBE Code rules were subject to a much lengthier and more
rigorous drafting procedure, one might expect a rule taken directly from the Declaration of Perugia
to be more cursory and perhaps ambiguous. I have made such an argument with respect to Rule 2.4
in Part II of this article, forthcoming.
As set forth below, many of the "General Principles" in the CCBE Code have antecedents in the
Declaration of Perugia. The CCBE Rule regarding "Independence," for example, has used almost all
of the language in § V(1-2) from the Declaration of Perugia. Compare CCBE CODE Rule 2.1 with
DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, at § VII(2). The CCBE Code did not carry forward the
language from Declaration section V(3).
The CCBE rule regarding "Trust and Personal Integrity" changed the language of Declaration
section III so that the obligation is now framed in positive, rather than negative terms. CCBE CODE
Rule 2.2. Instead of talking about when a trust relationship cannot exist, the CCBE Code now talks
about what is required in order for a relationship of trust to exist. Id.
The CCBE rule regarding "Confidentiality" is taken almost verbatim from Declaration section
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Several of these seven "General Principles" are, not surprisingly, rather
general. And because they are so general and basic, American lawyers may
have difficulty discovering how the nuances in application of these rules will
be different from the application of the Model Rules. For example, Rule 2.7,
which sets forth the duty of loyalty which requires a lawyer to put the client's
interests first, should appear noncontroversial to an American lawyer.
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Rule 2.2, regarding "Trust and Personal Integrity," similarly appears com-
pletely straightforward and noncontroversial.84 Rule 2.4, regarding "Re-
spect for the Rules of Other Bars and Law Societies," will be discussed at
length in the forthcoming Part II of this article. In a nutshell, however, this
provision asserts the noncontroversial proposition that lawyers have a duty
IV(l). CCBE CODE Rule 2.3.1. However, the remaining sections of this provision have no
counterpart in the Declaration. Id. at Rules 2.3.2-2.3.4. Similarly, some of the subsections of the
Declaration did not make it into the CCBE Code. See DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, at §
IV(2-4).
The CCBE rule regarding "Respect for the Rules of other Bars and Law Societies" uses the first
two sentences of Declaration section VIII, with only minor language changes. Compare CCBE CODE
Rule 2.4 ("Under community law (in particular under the Directive 77/249 of 22nd March 1977) a
lawyer from another Member State may be bound to comply with the rules of the Bar or Law Society
of the host Member State.") with DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, at § Vill ("The
Directive of 22 March 1977 specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer from another community
country is bound to comply with the rules of the Bar or Law Society of the host country.") The third
and fourth sentences of the Declaration were not carried forward into the "General Principles"
section of the CCBE Code.
The CCBE rule regarding "Personal Publicity," however, is completely different from the
statements contained in the Declaration. Whereas the Declaration of Perugia contained an absolute
ban on advertising, the CCBE Code recognizes that advertising may be permissible in certain
circumstances and in certain Member States. Compare CCBE CODE Rule 2.6 with DECLARATION OF
PERUGIA, supra note 28, at § VII.
The remaining two provisions in the "General Principles" section of the CCBE Code had no
counterpart in the Declaration ofPerugia. CCBE CODE Rules 2.5, 2.7.
83. This rule states:
Subject to due observance of all rules of law and professional conduct, a lawyer must always
act in the best interests of his client and must put those interests before his own interest or
those of fellow members of the legal profession.
CCBE CODE Rule 2.7.
In the U.S., there are still vigorous debates about how to balance a lawyer's duty of zealous
representation with a lawyer's obligations to the courts and the public, especially in the context of a
lawyer's revealing client confidences. I suspect, however, that participants in the debate could agree
with the principle expressed in CCBE Rule 2.7. No one denies the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
client. The issue in the U.S. would be "what does CCBE Rule 2.7 mean when it says 'subject to due
observance of all rules of law and professional conduct'? Can those other rules override the lawyer's
duty of loyalty and duty of confidentiality?"
84. This Rule provides:
Relationships of trust can only exist if a lawyer's personal honour, honesty and integrity are
beyond doubt. For the lawyer these traditional virtues are professional obligations.
CCBE CODE Rule 2.2.
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to inform themselves about the law which will affect them in the perfor-
mance of their duties.85
For two of the remaining provisions, however, the title "General
Principles" is a misnomer, since these rules function more as "conflicts of
laws" provisions as opposed to establishing substantive obligations. Rule
2.5, dealing with "Incompatible Occupations," is the first of these "conflicts
of law" provisions. As the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum pointed out
about Rule 2.5:
There are differences both between and within Member States on the
extent to which lawyers are permitted to engage in other occupations, for
example in commercial activities. The general purpose of rules excluding
a lawyer from other occupations is to protect him from influences which
might impair his independence or his role in the administration of justice.
The variations in these rules reflect different local conditions, different
perceptions of the proper function of lawyers and different techniques of
rule-making. For instance in some cases there is a complete prohibition of
engagement in certain named occupations, whereas in other cases engage-
ment in other occupations is generally permitted, subject to observance of
specific safeguards for the lawyer's independence.
86
The CCBE Code did not resolve these conflicts regarding what, if anything,
constitutes an incompatible occupation for a lawyer. Instead, Rule 2.5
essentially provides a "conflicts of law" rule by clarifying when the lawyer's
"Host State" rules apply and when the lawyer's "Home State" rules apply.
This rule identifies two situations in which a lawyer who is engaged in
cross-border activities should use the ethics rules of his "Host State," as
opposed to the ethics rules of his "Home State."87
The second "General Principle" which operates as a "conflicts of laws"
provision, rather than as substantive provision, is Rule 2.6 dealing with
advertising.88 Like Rule 2.5, which deals with "Incompatible Occupations,"
Rule 2.6 operates as a "conflicts of laws" provision by telling a lawyer which
85. CCBE CODE Rule 2.4.
86. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 2.5 cmt. See also DE CRAYENCOUR,
supra note 4, at 20-21 (articulating the principle of "independence" as one of the three most
important for the professions and explaining the basis for those who believe a professional should
not practice as an employee of another); Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678 (stating that the conflicting
rules with respect to incompatible occupations include differing views on the ability to take on
directorships in companies).
87. CCBE CODE Rule 2.5. The two situations in which a lawyer should use "Host State" rules are:
1) where a lawyer is representing or defending a client in legal proceedings or before a public
authority in the "Host State" and 2) where the lawyer has permanently set up shop in the "Host
State," i.e. where the lawyer has become "established" there. For a detailed discussion of the
jurisdictional issues of when the CCBE Code applies and the issues of when to use "Host State"
rules and "Home State" rules, see Part II, forthcoming.
88. See infra Appendix B & Appendix C.
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of several competing advertising provisions to use. As the CCBE Explana-
tory Memorandum points out:
The rules governing personal publicity by lawyers vary considerably in the
Member States. In some there is a complete prohibition of personal
publicity by lawyers; in others this prohibition has been (or is in the
process of being) relaxed substantially. Article 2.6 does not therefore
attempt to lay down a general standard on personal publicity.
8 9
Rule 2.6 thus deals with the conflict in advertising rules of the Member
States simply by forbidding a lawyer from advertising or seeking personal
publicity where it is not permitted.
Because this rule essentially imposes a geographic limitation on advertis-
ing, it also explains how the determination will be made as to location of the
advertisement:
Advertising and personal publicity shall be regarded as taking place where
it is permitted, if the lawyer concerned shows that it was placed for the
purpose of reaching clients or potential clients located where such adver-
tising or personal publicity is permitted and its communication elsewhere
is incidental. 90
While this advertising rule operates as a "conflicts of laws" rule, it is the
only "conflicts of law" rule in which the governing jurisdiction is not spelled
out. In situations where there is not a complete ban on advertising, Rule
2.6.1 states that "a lawyer should only advertise or seek personal publicity to
the extent and in the manner permitted by the rules to which he is
subject."9 1 While one could say that in this situation a lawyer is subject to
the "Host State" rules, this language may reflect a failure to resolve the
potentially contentious issue of whose advertising rules should bind a lawyer
in the situation where the "Host State" has more restrictive advertising
rules and in the situation where the "Home State" has more restrictive
advertising rules.92
89. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 2.6 cmt. Compare Toulmin, supra
note 4, at 681 (noting that in many jurisdictions, the rules on lawyer advertising have been
transformed within the last ten years) with Update: The Latest From the German Bar Association,
LAWS. EUR., March/April 1992, at 4 (noting that the German Constitutional Court recently held
that the restrictive advertising rules were consistent with basic human and professional rights) and
Update: Spanish Bar Association Opposes Government Changes, LAWS. EUR., September/October
1992, at 4 (noting that the Spanish Competition Authority has concluded that the lawyer advertising
rules are anti-competitive).
90. CCBE CODE Rule 2.6.2.
91. CCBE CODE Rule 2.6.1.
92. There is an alternative explanation for Rule 2.6.1's failure to specify whether the lawyer
should use "Host State" or "Home State" rules. The drafters of the CCBE Code may have thought
that the issue of which advertising rules to use was already covered by the 1977 Lawyer's Services
Directive. To Facilitate the Effective Exercise by Lawyers of Freedom to Provide Services, COUNCIL
[Vol. 7:1
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ETHICS CODE
A third "General Principle" in the CCBE Code, Rule 2.3, deals with the
topic of confidentiality. 93 While this rule purports to be a general principle,
it may in fact hide an unresolved disagreement. Thus, although this rule has
substantive content, this rule perhaps should have been drafted instead as a
"conflicts of law" provision instead.
Rule 2.3 establishes an absolute rule of confidentiality without any excep-
tions. It defines the information protected, indicates that a lawyer is bound
to respect this confidentiality even after representation ceases, and imposes
upon a lawyer a duty to ensure that the lawyer's support staff protect this
confidentiality.94 Furthermore, the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum's com-
ment on Rule 2.3 contains nothing which would undercut the conclusion
that this confidentiality rule is absolute.95
Although Rule 2.3 appears to be absolute, there may be more disagree-
ment lurking behind this rule than the rule suggests. The Declaration of
Perugia, for example, states:
2. While there can be no doubt as to the essential principle of the duty of
confidentiality, the Consultative Committee [CCBE] has found that there
are significant differences between the member countries as to the precise
extent of the lawyer's rights and duties. These differences which are
sometimes very subtle in character especially concern the rights and
duties of a lawyer vis-a-vis his client, the courts in criminal cases and
administrative authorities in fiscal cases.
3. Where there is any doubt the Consultative Committee is of the opinion
that the strictest rule should be observed - that is, the rule which offers
the best protection against breach of confidence.
4. The Consultative Committee most strongly urges the Bars and Law
Societies of the Community to give their help and assistance to members
of the profession from other countries in guaranteeing protection of
professional confidentiality.
96
While it is certainly possible that the "significant differences" referred to
in the Declaration of Perugia have been resolved, this author is inclined to be
skeptical, especially in view of the silence of the Explanatory Memorandum
on this issue.97 Moreover, the absolute nature of CCBE Rule 2.3 regarding
DIRECTIVE, March 22, 1977 (77/249/EEC) [hereinafter Lawyer Services Directive]. This jurisdic-
tional issue of which Member State's advertising rules are proper is discussed in detail in Part II,
forthcoming. See infra note 117 for discussion of this Directive and the substantive EC law.
93. CCBE CODE Rule 2.3.
94. Id.
95. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 2.3 cmt.
96. DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, § IV (2-4).
97. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 2.3 cmt. (containing no mention of
how the issue of conflicts among Member States regarding confidentiality was resolved). Despite
this silence, John Toulmin, one of the drafters of the CCBE Code, has explained that the committee
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confidentiality may in fact be undercut by Rule 4.4, regarding "False or
Misleading Information," which states that "a lawyer shall never knowingly
give false or misleading information to the court."98 Rule 4.4 may operate as
an exception to the confidentiality provision of the CCBE Code. 99 The
had the task of reconciling the differing rules regarding confidential correspondence. Toulmin,
supra note 4, at 679.
Some of these differences which exist among the EC Member States' approach to the topic of
"confidentiality" were set forth in a report authored by D.A.O. Edward of the Scotland Bar on
behalf of the CCBE. See generally D.A.O. EDWARD, CCBE, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET, CONFIDEN-
TIALITY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1976). (This report is available directly from the CCBE. See supra note 4 for
correspondence information.) This report highlighted the fact that one cannot even use a single
term, such as confidentiality, from country-to-country. Id. at 9. The primary source of law in this
area derives from "an Article of the Penal Code, which provides that it is an offence ... to reveal
another person's 'secret'." Id. at 10. However, there are differences between the member states as to
who is bound to preserve the "professional secret." For instance, the terms of the Code are general
and broad in France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg. Id. at 15. The report explains:
In these four states the words of the Code are wide enough to include lawyers from any
state, their 'stagiaires' and other employees. The words are also wide enough to impose the
duty of secrecy even if the secret has been communicated before the professional
relationship of lawyer and client has been formally created, and to preserve the duty after
that relationship has ended.
Id.
In contrast, the terms of the Code in Germany apply to specific persons, including the Rechtsan-
walt, Patentanwalt, Notary, and defense advocate. Id. at 16. There is also no express reference to
lawyers from other states. Id. at 17. Differences in the approach to correspondence among lawyers
was also noted. Id. at 29. Thus, while the underlying principles are substantially similar, there are
enough differences in approach that a single term can be misleading because of the implications that
accompany it.
This report was referred to in the CCBE's submission to the European Court of Justice in support
of the existence of a lawyer's privilege of confidentiality. See CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch.
3, at 33. The European Court of Justice supported the CCBE's position. Sandy Ghandhi, Legal
Professional Privilege in European Community Law, 7 EUR. L. REV. 308, 312-13 (1989). The Court
concluded that although there was no attorney-client privilege explicitly set forth in the relevant
treaties and laws, the EC Commission had no right to subpoena documents which would violate an
attorney client privilege. Id. The court based its recognition of the attorney-client privilege on the
fact that all Member States recognized such a privilege, even though differences in the nature and
scope of the privilege existed. Id. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R.
1575, 2 C.M.L.R. 264, 322-25 (1982).
98. CCBE CODE Rule 4.4. The comment to Rule 4.4 in the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum
states in full that "this provision applies the principle that the lawyer must never knowingly mislead
the court. This is necessary if there is to be trust between the courts and the legal profession." CCBE
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 4.4 cmt.
99. The possibility of conflict between Rule 4.4 and Rule 2.3 was recently noted by another
commentator. See Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 4, at 629. One of the
Austrian delegates to the CCBE explained Rule 4.4 by stating that in the Anglo-American trial
tradition, the lawyer's duty to find the truth is at least as important as, if not more important than,
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client and therefore the lawyer may not knowingly introduce false
testimony. Thus, a lawyer who is subject to Rule 4.4. of the CCBE Code may, in certain certain cases,
be required to breach the duty of confidentiality and repress the duty of loyalty to the client. The
Committee did not comment further on whether this "Anglo-American" approach was inconsistent
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European Community is quite possibly confronting the same debate which
has occurred and is still occurring in the U.S. about how to balance the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality on the one hand and the duty to uphold the
law and serve justice on the other hand.' 00 Unlike the situation in the U.S.,
however, this debate currently appears to be an underground debate in the
EC. Instead of acknowledging any disagreement and adopting a "conflicts
of law"-type provision, the CCBE Code presents the absolute right to
confidentiality as a "General Principle" concerning which there is no
debate. Thus, despite its language, Rule 2.3 may ultimately prove to be less
of a "general principle" than it at first purports to be.
The remaining provision of the "General Principles" section is Rule 2.1,
addressing the topic of "Independence."' t ' Emphasizing the importance of
independent action of the part of the lawyer in all aspects of representa-
tion, 10 2 this provision imposes substantive obligations, rather than a "con-
flicts of law" provision."0 3 In sum, the title of the "General Principles"
section of the CCBE Code is somewhat misleading since not all of the
principles contained in this section could be described as "General
Principles." Instead, this section of the CCBE Code functions not only as a
legal ethics code providing substantive standards for regulation but also as
a "conflicts of law" code addressing the issue of which country's legal ethics
rules to use for particular issues.
3. The "Relations With Clients" Provisions in the CCBE Code
The "Relations with Clients" section of the CCBE Code contains nine
rules. Of these nine rules, the last seven might be said to deal in one way or
another with money-related issues.10 4 The first rule in this section is not a
money-related rule but instead sets forth the conditions for a lawyer's
with the Austrian legal ethics rules, or whether revision would be required in order to make
Austrian law consistent with CCBE Rule 4.4. Instead, it merely referred the reader to the literature
and cases decided pursuant to § 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code (StGB) which establish the
definition and limits of false testimony in a case. See Hempel, supra note 30, at 209.
100. For an overview of the issues and debates concerning the proper course of action a lawyer
should take when faced with either future or past client perjury, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT ANNOTATED 339-347 (2d ed. 1992); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:401-423
(1993); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.3 (2d ed. Supp. 1991 & Supp. 1992) (especially
note § 3.3:219-220, which gives an overview of the leading articles which set forth this debate).
101. CCBE CODE Rule 2.1.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 186-192 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Rule 2.1.
104. These seven rules cover the topics of contingency fees, regulation of fees, regulating advance
deposits for fees, fee-sharing with non-lawyers, safekeeping of client property, a duty to notify a
client of legal aid opportunities, and malpractice insurance. CCBE CODE Rules 3.3-3.9.
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acceptance and termination of instructions from a client.'0 5 The second
rule, which also is not a money-related rule, contains the regulations
regarding conflicts of interest. t 6 While the substance of many of these rules
will look familiar to an American lawyer, several of them contain matters
that an American might find surprising.
The first surprise an American might encounter lies in CCBE Rule 3.1,
which deals with a lawyer's acceptance and termination of instructions.'
0 7
This rule includes subsections which are counterparts to many of the
requirements found in the ABA's Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, and thus are not
surprising."t 8 For example, this ethical standard requires lawyers to repre-
sent their clients conscientiously and diligently and to keep their clients
informed as to the progress of the matter.10 9 It also forbids lawyers from
handling matters that they are not competent to handle. "0 Finally, the rule
addresses the issue of withdrawal, prohibiting withdrawal "in such a way or
in such circumstances that the client may be unable to find other legal
assistance in time to prevent prejudice being suffered by the client. '
Upon closer examination, the first surprising aspect of this rule occurs in
CCBE Rule 3.1.1, which states:
A lawyer shall not handle a case for a party except on his instructions. He
may, however, act in a case in which he has been instructed by another lawyer
who himself acts for theparty or where the case has been assigned to him by
a competent body.
112
This rule thus seemingly allows the "substitution" of attorneys, a permitted
practice in several European countries." 3 Under this practice, a lawyer who
is unable to handle part of a case (such as a court appointment) contacts
another lawyer and asks that second lawyer to handle the case. Both under
this rule and in practice in at least some countries, this substitution of
attorneys does not require the consent of the client and can be done without
the client ever being aware of such substitution."'
105. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.
106. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.
107. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.
108. These rules speak to competence, diligence, and communication. MODEL RULES Rules 1.1,
1.3, 1.4.
109. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.2.
110. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.3.
111. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.4.
112. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.1 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., the classified advertisements ["Anzeigen"] in the Austrian Bar Association's
monthly magazine, in which lawyers seek other lawyers to handle this "substitution" work for them.
OSTERREICHISCHES ANWALTSBLATT, Jan. 1992, at 84-85.
114. Nothing in the Austrian statutes regulating lawyers nor the administrative regulations which
are comparable to an ethics code require client consent before such "substitution" work is
permitted. See generally RECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG [hereinafter RAO], 1868 RGBI 96 and RICHTLIN-
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Depending on how it is ultimately interpreted, an American might also
find Rule 3.1.2 surprising. Part of this rule requires a lawyer to "undertake
personal responsibility for the discharge of the instructions given to him."'
1 5
The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum explains:
The provision that he shall undertake personal responsibility for the
discharge of the instructions given to him means that he cannot avoid
responsibility by delegation to others. It does not prevent him from
seeking to limit his legal liability to the extent that this is permitted by the
relevant law or professional rules.'
1 6
If Rule 3.1.2 were interpreted to mean that within an office a lawyer may not
delegate responsibility to another lawyer in the firm, an American might
then find this provision surprising.
An American might also be surprised by the strictness of the conflict of
interest provisions of Rule 3.2.17 Under Rule 3.2, "a lawyer may not advise,
represent or act on behalf of two or more clients in the same matter if there
is a conflict, or a significant risk of a conflict, between the interests of those
clients."1 1 8 The rule also requires a lawyer to cease acting for both clients, if
a conflict arises later, where there is a risk of breach of confidence, or where
the lawyer's independence may be impaired." 9 This rule also has a "former
clients" conflict section, forbidding a lawyer from accepting a new client if
there is a risk of breach of the confidences of the former client or if the
lawyer's knowledge of the former client would give an unfair advantage to
the new client.1 20 This conflicts rule also has an imputed disqualification
provision which applies to the other members of the lawyer's firm.
1 21
However, unlike the rules familar to American attorneys, this conflict
rule does not contain a consent exception. This rule does not provide the
IEN FUR DIE AUSOBUNG DES RECHTSANWALTSBERUFES, FOR DIE UBERWACHUNG DER PFLICHTEN DES
RECHTSANWALTES UND FUR DIE AUSBILDUNG DER RECHTSANWALTSANWARTER (RL-BA 1977) [here-
inafter RICHTLINIEN or the RL-BA], both of which are reprinted in DR. WALTER SCHUPPICH & DR.
HELMUTH TADES, RECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG (4th ed. 1991), at 2-49 and at 171-186, respectively. An
Austro-American lawyer, who has practiced in both Boston and Vienna, advised me that this
substitution work sometimes occurs without client knowledge or express consent. Interview with Dr.
Nicholas A. Simon, in Vienna, Austria (April 29, 1992).
115. CCBE CODE Rule 3.1.2.
116. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 3.1 cmt.
117. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2. The 1977 Lawyer's Services Directive is also relevant to the topic of
conflict of interest. This Directive states that the Host State may regulate conflicts of interest and
confidentiality without prejudice to "Home State" rules. See Lawyer's Services Directive, supra note
92.
118. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.1. This conflicts rule may be stricter than the conflicts rules used in
some CCBE Member States. See Toulmin, supra note 4, at 682.
119. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.2.
120. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.3.
121. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.4.
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client with the authority to waive the restrictions and assume the risk of
representation. Thus, if this omission of a consent exception is interpreted
to mean that there in fact is no such exception, then European "lawyers"
would be left with a paternalistic approach contrary to the American model
which elevates the client's autonomy and thus assures the right to assume
certain risks.' 2
This interpretation of the conflict of interest rule, however, may not be
correct. The ommission of a consent exception might be interpreted to
mean only that the issue has not been discussed or resolved. For example,
the editor of the CCBE Compendium has indicated her belief that a client
may waive certain potential conflicts of interest after proper consultation
and therefore that the CCBE Code should contain the same principle.123
Consequently, CCBE Rule 3.2 ultimately might not be found to be so strict
as it at first appears.
An American reader might be equally surprised by one of the seven fee
provisions in the "Relations with Clients" section of the CCBE Code. At
first glance, Rule 3.3 of the CCBE Code appears to prohibit contingency
fees.124 The first subsection of this rule simply states that "[a] lawyer shall
not be entitled to make apactum de quota litis [contingency fee]. 12 5
The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum also suggests, at first glance, that
there is a common position in the EC Member States against contingency
fees.126 The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum is correct in the sense that
pure contingency fees are virtually, if not universally, prohibited in Eu-
rope.' 27 Some of the rationales for the prohibition against contingency fees
122. This "no waiver" aspect of the conflicts rule recently was noted by one of the CCBE Code
drafters. Toulmin, supra note 4, at 682. For an overview of some of the issues that can arise with
respect to the issue of whether client waiver is appropriate and the competing concerns of client
autonomy and paternalism, see Unified Sewerage Agency, Inc. v. Jelco, 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
123. Interview with Dorothy Margaret Donald-Little, editor of the CCBE Compendium, in
Friedburg, Germany (June 26, 1992). Indeed, the comments of one of the Code drafters implicitly
suggests that perhaps a consent exception is needed. Toulmin, supra note 4, at 682 ("It may be that
in a code of universal application, this matter can be resolved by adding a clause permitting waiver
by the client provided that such waiver is freely given after the issues have been fully explained to
the client.")
124. CCBE CODE Rule 3.3; see also Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678 (indicating that the provisions
about contingency fees generated considerable discussion).
125. CCBE CODE Rule 3.3.
126. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 3.3 cmt. (providing that "these
provisions reflect the common position in all Member States that an unregulated agreement for
contingency fees (Pactum de Quota Litis) is contrary to the proper administration of justice because
it encourages speculative litigation and is liable to be abused"). Toulmin, supra note 4, at 682 n.54.
127. See HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 32, Rule 7.1; HANDBOOKS - EC
OBSERVER STATES, supra note 32, Rule 7.1 Contingency fees are expressly prohibited in Austria,
Cyprus, Germany, Norway, and Spain; contingency fees are prohibited "except as in accordance
with the CCBE Code of Conduct" in Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. Id. See also
CCBE CODE, Rule 3.3.
[Vol. 7:1
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ETHICS CODE
are remarkably similar to the critique of contingency fees which one reads in
the United States. To the critics, contingency fees encourage speculative
litigation. In addition, a lawyer's independence and judgment may be
compromised when that same lawyer has a stake in a case financed by
contingency fees. 2"
The absolute prohibition on contingency fees contained in Rule 3.3.1,
however, is partially relieved by the exception found in Rule 3.3.3. This
subsection excludes from the contingency fee ban "an agreement that fees
be charged in proportion to the value of a matter handled by the lawyer if
this is in accordance with an officially approved fee scale or under the
control of the competent authority having jurisdiction over the lawyer." '29
This exception thus permits the use of bar-approved fee schedules which
add a premium to the lawyer's fee if successful and which therefore are a
form of contingency fee. ' 30 (There has been little or no concern on the part
of the bar associations with respect to the issue of whether bar-approved fee
schedules would violate any antitrust provisions.)
13 '
Rule 3.4 of the CCBE Code confirms that the antitrust issues which
proved to be a barrier in the United States to such bar-approved fee
schedules are not, at the moment, troubling to the drafters of the CCBE
Code. Rule 3.4, in fact, expressly permits such fee schedules.132 After
requiring a fee to be "fair and reasonable," this rule continues by saying that
in the absence of a proper fee agreement to the contrary, a lawyer's fees
shall be regulated by the bar society to which the lawyer belongs and which
has the closest connection to the contract between the lawyer and client.
133
The remaining money-related rules in the "Relations with Clients"
section of the CCBE Code probably would not surprise an American. Rule
3.5, for example, permits a lawyer to require a deposit which is a reasonable
128. See supra note 126.
129. CCBE CODE Rule 3.3.3.
130. See supra note 126. See also Toulmin, supra note 4, at 682-83 (citing the Paris and Portugal
bars as examples of bars that permit a lawyer to charge a larger fee when successful, and England
and Wales where, since 1990, by written agreement an advocate may receive a higher than normal
fee if successful and no fee if unsuccessful).
131. Compare Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)(holding that a mandatory
minimum fee schedule published by a county bar association and enforced by the state bar violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act) with Update: Spanish Bar Association Opposes Government Changes,
LAWS. EUR., September/October 1992, at 4 (noting the Spanish Bar's objections to a report by the
Spanish Competition Authority which proposed eliminating the rules on minimum fees on the
grounds that they were anticompetitive). Neither the CCBE Code nor the CCBE Explanatory
Memorandum mention the issue of whether such fees would be improper on antitrust grounds.
132. See CCBE CODE Rule 3.4.
133. CCBE CODE Rule 3.4. See also DE CRAYENCOUR, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that "[s]cales of
fees can sometimes seem incompatible with the independence and autonomy of self-employed
professional people," but then explaining why they are acceptable).
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estimate of the fees and permits the lawyer to withdraw for failed payment,
subject to the withdrawal limits set forth in Rule 3.1.134 Rule 3.6 prohibits a
lawyer from sharing fees with a non-lawyer, with the exception of a lawyer's
heirs. 135 Rule 3.7 has no counterpart in the Model Rules; the rule contains
the not-so-surprising requirement that lawyers must inform their clients of
the availability of legal aid, where applicable.
13 6
Rule 3.8, which deals with client funds, is strict but probably not too
surprising to an American. Nevertheless, this rule establishes stricter stan-
dards than some of the client fund rules currently found in CCBE Member
and Observer States. 13 7 These provisions of this rule have been described by
a member of the drafting committee as "significant advances in client
protection.' ' 138 This rule requires a lawyer to segregate client funds from
other funds, requires client funds to be held in an identifiable account in a
bank or other institution subject to the supervision of a public authority
unless agreed otherwise, requires that records be maintained, and requires
that the lawyer not use these funds for purposes or clients other than those
for which they were intended.1 39 Rule 3.8's only potential surprise lies in its
declaration that the "competent authorities in all Member States" should
have the power to conduct random audits of these trust accounts. 140 These
"client funds" requirements set forth in Rule 3.8 establish a minimum
threshold with which a lawyer must comply. The rule indicates that in
addition to the above rules, a lawyer must comply with his "Home State"
rules when they are stricter. 4 The rule, however, does provide certain
circumstances under which a lawyer who is practicing in a "Host State" may
arrange to comply with the Host State rules, rather than the "Home State"
rules.
142
The final provision of the "Relations with Clients" section of the CCBE
Code addresses the topic of malpractice or professional indemnity insur-
ance. Rule 3.9 begins with the general principle that "[l]awyers shall be
insured at all times against claims based on professional negligence to an
extent which is reasonable having regard to the nature and extent of the
risks which lawyers incur in practice.' 143 The rule continues by providing
134. CCBE CODE Rule 3.5.
135. CCBE CODE Rule 3.6.
136. CCBE CODE Rule 3.7.
137. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 4, at 603.
138. Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678.




143. CCBE CODE Rule 3.9.
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various "conflicts of law" provisions which specify whose malpractice
insurance rules a lawyer should use - "Host State" or "Home State.' 44 As
the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum explains, this rule "reflects a Recom-
mendation, also adopted by the CCBE in Brussels in November 1985, on the
need for all lawyers in the Community to be insured against the risks arising
from professional negligence claims against them. Again in some Member
States such an obligation has not yet been introduced for internal
purposes." 145 Thus, by agreeing to adopt the CCBE's rule, transforming the
CCBE recommendation for malpractice insurance into a mandatory require-
ment, each member of the CCBE has agreed to adopt for its cross-border
practice situations a mandatory malpractice insurance requirement. (Al-
though this kind of requirement is rare in the United States, it is not
unknown. 146)
In sum, while many of the provisions in the "Relations with Clients"
section of the CCBE Code will look familiar to Americans, there are some
provisions which may come as a surprise, particularly the provision which
deals with the "substitution" of another lawyer and the provisions which
show a completely different view of what are considered appropriate and
inappropriate methods of setting fees.
4. The "Relations With the Courts" Provisions in the CCBE Code
The CCBE Code has five rules which set forth a lawyer's relationship with
the courts. Four of these rules might be described as substantive "legal
ethics" provisions, while the remaining provision might be described as a
"conflicts of law" provision. Of the four substantive provisions, three
appear to be relatively noncontroversial provisions.
The first of the three noncontroversial provisions is Rule 4.1 concerning
the "applicable rules of conduct in court." This rule states that a "lawyer
who appears, or takes part in a case, before a court or tribunal in a Member
State must comply with the rules of conduct applied before that court or
144. Id.
145. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 3.9. Undoubtedly because this
mandatory insurance obligation did not exist in all member states, a drafter of the CCBE Code
described this rule as a "significant advance." Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678.Accord Goebel, Lawyers
in the European Community, supra note 4, at 603. A recent article pointed out, however, that "there
is still a long way to go" with respect to consistency in the rules regarding malpractice protection.
John Young, Professional Indemnity Insurance: Compulsory Arrangements in England and Wales, 15
LAWS. IN EUROPE 9, 11 (May-June 1992).
146. See generally K. Hall, PLF Progress, 1978-92, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1992, at 41 (reviewing the
history of Oregon's mandatory malpractice requirement and resulting bar-owned captive malprac-
tice insurance carrier).
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tribunal." 14 7 (This rule is thus comparable to Rule 3.4(c) of the Model
Rules. 148)
The second noncontroversial rule in the "Relations with the Courts"
section is CCBE Rule 4.3 concerning a lawyer's "demeanour in court." This
rule states "La] lawyer shall while maintaining due respect and courtesy
towards the court defend the interests of his client honourably and in a way
which he considers will be to the client's best advantage within the limits of
the law."' 149 (This rule might be compared to the Model Rule 3.5(c) which
forbids a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 5 °
It also touches on the decision-making authority principles reflected in
Model Rule 1.2(a) which requires a lawyer to "abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation . .. [and] consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.")' 5 ' While lawyers may
disagree about how to apply Rule 4.3 of the CCBE Code to a particular
situation, the underlying principle is not particularly controversial.
The third noncontroversial provision in this section is CCBE Rule 4.5,
which confirms that "[t]he rules governing a lawyer's relations with the
courts apply also to his relations with arbitrators and any other persons
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, even on an occasional basis."'
'5 2
The potentially "controversial" substantive "legal ethics" provision gov-
erning a lawyer's relationship with the courts in the CCBE Code is Rule 4.4
concerning "False or Misleading Information." This rule states in its
entirety: "A lawyer shall never knowingly give false or misleading informa-
tion to the court.' 53 As described above in the discussion of the confidenti-
ality requirement of CCBE Rule 2.3, the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum
contains no explanation of the parameters of this rule. 154 Thus, it is not yet
clear whether the same debate will emerge in the European Community
that has emerged in the United States concerning how this duty of candor to
147. CCBE CODE Rule 4.1. It should be noted that neither the CCBE Code nor the CCBE
Explanatory Memorandum define what is meant by the terms "judge", "court," or "tribunal" which
are used throughout this section of the CCBE Code. In other words, there is no counterpart to Rule
1.4, which defined the legal professionals in each CCBE Member and Observer State to whom the
CCBE Code applied.
148. Model Rule 3.4 (c) states:
A lawyer shall not:
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open
refusal based on an assertion that no rated obligation exists.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(c).
149. CCBE CODE Rule 4.3.
150. MODEL RULES Rule 3.5(c).
151. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a).
152. CCBE CODE Rule 4.5.
153. CCBE CODE Rule 4.4.
154. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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the court should be balanced against the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.1 55
If such a debate is possible, then CCBE Rule 4.4 certainly has provided less
guidance on this issue than is provided by the Comments to the ABA's
Model Rule 3.3(a).1
56
The remaining provision dealing with a lawyer's relationship with the
courts is as much a "conflicts of law" provision as it is a "legal ethics"
provision. This remaining rule - CCBE Rule 4.2 - is titled "Fair Conduct
of Proceedings." It states:
A lawyer must always have due regard for the fair conduct of proceedings.
He must not, for example, make contact with the judge without first
informing the lawyer acting for the opposing party or submit exhibits,
notes or documents to the judge without communicating them in good
time to the lawyer of the other side unless such steps are permitted under the
relevant rules of procedure.' 
57
Although the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum does not emphasize this
issue, it does confirm the possibility that in some Member States there will
be rules which permit a lawyer to have exparte contacts with a judge. 158 And
indeed, this possibility is an actuality; in some member states, ex parte
155. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. It is also unclear how CCBE Rule 4.4
compares with Model Rule 3.3. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, a leading expert on the Model Rules, has
noted that CCBE Rule 4.4 may go further because a lawyer subject to the CCBE rule may not
"knowingly offer 'false or misleading' information," whereas Model Rule 3.3 prohibits a lawyer from
"knowingly offering false evidence." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., March 30, 1992, at 13.
156. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly offering "evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." The rule itself does not explain what constitutes
"reasonable remedial measures." The Comment, however, provides guidance by stating:
[Tihe advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If
that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If
withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should make
disclosure to the court. It is for the court then to determine what should be done - making
a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps doing
nothing.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. Although this rule and comment do not provide perfect guidance, see
generally authorities cited in the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED, at 342-45
(2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES ANN.]. They provide significantly more guidance than is
provided by CCBE Rule 4.4.
157. CCBE CODE Rule 4.2.
158. The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum states with regard to Rule 4.2:
This provision applies the general principle that in adversarial proceedings a lawyer must
not attempt to take unfair advantage of his opponent, in particular by unilateral communi-
cations with the judge. An exception however is made for any steps permitted under the
relevant rules of the court in question (see also on 4.5 below [concerning demeanor in
court]).
CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 4.2.
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contacts with the court on "non-fundamental" issues is not prohibited. t5 9
Because Rule 4.2 does not provide a substantive provision outlawing exparte
contacts but instead defers to the procedural rule of the particular Member
State, it should properly be referred to as a "conflicts of law" rule. 6 '
In sum, three of the five "Relations With the Courts" rules in the CCBE
Code are completely straightforward and noncontroversial. A fourth rule,
which does not prohibit ex parte contacts between a lawyer and a judge, is
not so much controversial as it is surprising to an American reader. The fifth
rule may ultimately prove quite controversial. This rule, which deals with a
lawyer's duty of candor to the court, does not on its face indicate that it is
subject of disagreement, much less controversy. The experience in the
United States, however, suggests that this rule may ultimately prove to be
controversial.
159. See CODE OF CONDUCT - GERMANY, § 8.3 at 31 ("A lawyer may contact or submit
documents or exhibits to a judge without the knowledge of the lawyer(s) or the opposing client(s) in
the case."); CODE OF CONDUCT - BELGIUM, § 8.3, at 33 ("An advocate may not contact or submit
documents or exhibits to a judge without the knowledge of the lawyer(s) or the opposing client(s) in
the case unless such steps are permitted under the relevant rules of procedure."), both reprinted in
HANDBOOKS - EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 32. The German legal ethics regulation that
appears most relevant is section 9(2) of the Grundsdtze des anwaltlichen Standesrechts, Richlinien
gemdipf §177 Abs. 2 Nr. 2 BRAO [RichtlRAl. This regulation might be translated into English as
follows: "Any attempt to influence the judge's decision with irrelevant means is a violation of the
code of ethics, especially to invoke someone who legally cannot influence the decision, or to
disparage the judge because of his decision."
Furthermore, even some of the countries that are listed in the CCBE Compendium as not
permitting exparte contact may in fact in some circumstances permit such contact. For example, the
CCBE Compendium states, "A lawyer may not contact or submit documents/exhibits to a judge
without the knowledge of the opposing lawyer in the case." CODE OF CONDUCT - AUSTRIA § 8.3 at
31, reprinted in HANDBOOKS - EC OBSERVER STATES, supra note 32. In fact, however, neither the
statute regulating lawyers nor the administrative regulations governing lawyers contains an express
ban on a lawyer's exparte contacts with a judge. See generally RAO and RL-BA, supra note 114. In a
conversation with Dr. Karl Hempel, a former Austrian representative to the CCBE, Dr. Hempel
confirmed that there was no explicit prohibition on exparte communications, but he indicated that
communication on fundamental issues would be improper. Interview with Dr. Karl Hempel, former
Austrian representative to the CCBE, in Vienna, Austria (July 6, 1992). Dr. Nicholas Simon, an
Austro-American lawyer who has practiced in both Boston and Vienna, has indicated that he sees
more ex parte contact in Vienna than in Boston. Interview with Dr. Nicholas Simon, in Vienna,
Austria (April 29, 1992).
160. Using this definition, Model Rule 3.5, which is the counterpart to CCBE Rule 4.2, might
similarly be described as more of a "conflict of laws" provision than a substantive legal ethics
provision. Model Rule 3.5 states:
Rule 3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means
prohibited by law;
(b) communicate exparte with such a person except as permitted by law; or
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.5.
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5. The "Relations Between Lawyers" Provisions in the CCBE Code
The CCBE Code also contains a section entitled "Relations Between
Lawyers." There are nine provisions in this section, four of which are based
at least in part on provisions that were contained in the CCBE's 1977
Declaration of Perugia.1 6 1 The predominant themes in this section are issues
of money on the one hand and issues of collegiality and cooperation on the
other hand. Many of these rules are expressly designed to protect the
interests of the lawyer. (This section also contains the rule against commu-
nicating with an opposing party and a rule requiring training of young
lawyers.) Of these nine rules, only one rule - Rule 5.3 which deals with
correspondence between lawyers - might be described as a "conflicts of
laws" provision. This rule is probably the most important rule in this section
of the CCBE Code because it adresses an issue about which many European
Community lawyers probably know very little.
The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum gives the background of Rule 5.3 as
follows:
In certain Member States communications between lawyers (written or
by word of mouth) are normally regarded as confidential. This means that
lawyers accept that those communications may not be disclosed to others
and copies may not be sent to the lawyers' own client. This principle is
recognised in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain. Such communications if in writing are often marked as 'confidential'
or 'sous la foi du Palais."
6 2
(The CCBE Explanatory Memorandum then compared this approach with
the approaches taken in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany.) The
CCBE Explanatory Memorandum then continued as follows:
These differences often give rise to misunderstandings between lawyers of
different Member States who correspond with each other. For this reason,
lawyers should be particularly careful to clarify the basis upon which
correspondence with lawyers in other Member States is sent and received.
In particular a lawyer who wishes to make a confidential or 'without
prejudice' communication to a colleague in a Member State where the
161. The Section of the Declaration of Perugia that was used as a model for the CCBE Code in this
area is Article VI, entitled "The Corporate Spirit of the Profession". Section 1 of Article VI became
CCBE Rule 5.1, also entitled "Corporate Spirit of the Profession." Section 2 of the Article, dealing
with communications between lawyers, is embodied in CCBE Rule 5.3, entitled "Correspondence
Between Lawyers." Section 3 of Article VI, dealing with competence, became CCBE Rule 5.2,
entitled "Co-operation among Lawyers of Different Members States." The last section of Article
VI, dealing with financial obligations, became CCBE Rule 5.7, "Responsibility for Fees." Compare
DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, at art. VI, §§ 1-4 with CCBE CODE Rules 5.1-5.3, 5.7.
162. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 5.3.
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rules may be different should ask in advance whether it can be accepted as
such. 1
63
The CCBE Code has not attempted to adopt a single substantive legal
ethics provision which would eliminate these different approaches. Indeed,
the CCBE Code has not even provided a "conflicts of law" provision
addressing the issue of the confidentiality of lawyer-to-lawyer communica-
tions that would establish which of these conflicting rules will set the terms
by which the confidentiality of such correspondence can be judged. Instead,
the CCBE Code has opted for an education approach which requires
lawyers to communicate with one another about this topic in an effort to
avoid misunderstandings. 164 This rule provides:
5.3 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LAWYERS
5.3.1 If a lawyer sending a communication to a lawyer in another Member
State wishes it to remain confidential or without prejudice he should
clearly express this intention when communicating the document.
5.3.2. If the recipient of the communication is unable to ensure its status
as confidential or without prejudice he should return it to the sender
without revealing the contents to others.'
65
This approach, of course, does not address the age-old question of
whether "you can put the genie back in the bottle." A recipient lawyer faces
a dilemma if practicing in a jurisdiction where a lawyer has no right to keep
information confidential from the client. In such circumstances, Rule 5.3.2
requires the lawyer to return the "confidential" correspondence to the
originating lawyer. However, if a lawyer must read a letter in order to learn
that the sender intended it to be confidential, and thereafter must decline
acceptance of the correspondence Without revealing its contents to the
client, though, the lawyer is in reality withholding information from the
client. Can a lawyer, in essence, act as if the lawyer has not in fact obtained
this information? The solution adopted by the CCBE may not be completely
163. Id.
164. The "educatorv" nature of this rule is no doubt due in part to the fact that this provision
proved to be one of the most difficult to draft in view of the differences among the CCBE
representatives. See Toulmin, supra note 4, at 679-684 nn.63-65. However, education certainly
appears to be acutely needed in this area because of the different terminology used in different
countries. For instance, the terms used can have different meanings as well as different methods of
enforcement. Thus, whereas some countries speak of "legal privilege," others speak of
"confidentiality" and still others speak of "le secret professionnel" (the professional secret).
Furthermore, while some countries recognize the confidentiality of correspondence, others do not.
For an excellent overview of the different terms and their meanings, see generally EDWARD, supra
note 97.
165. CCBE CODE Rule 5.3.
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logical or elegant, but it probably avoids more misunderstandings and
disputes than a "conflicts of law" provision would have. 1
66
Although the concepts underlying Rule 5.3 and lawyers' correspondence
might be unfamiliar to an American reader, the concepts underlying the
remaining "Relations Between Lawyers" provisions are relatively clear.
However, although the tone of some of these provisions may sound familiar,
an American reader might not expect the express acknowledgment in some
provisions of their intent to protect the interests of the legal profession in
general or each member of it in particular. These remaining rules of this
section of the CCBE Code are summarized below.
Both CCBE Rules 5.1 and 5.2 raise the issue of "cooperation." Rule 5.1
addresses the topic of the "corporate spirit of the profession" and requires
cooperation among lawyers, but not at the expense of clients.' 67 Rule 5.2,
titled "Co-operation among Lawyers of Different Member States," requires
a lawyer not to undertake from a lawyer in another Member State a matter
which the lawyer is not competent to handle. 68 Moreover, if the contacted
lawyer is not able to help the lawyer from another Member State, that
lawyer must help that person locate the appropriate person who can be of
assistance. 169
Rule 5.4 forbids a lawyer from requesting or receiving a referral fee in
exchange for referring or recommending a client.' 70 Although the language
of this rule is absolute and contains no exceptions, a court or disciplinary
body interpreting this code might conceivably find that there is an implicit
exception to this rule. Such an finding might be based, in part, on the
language of the accompanying CCBE Explanatory Memorandum. The CCBE
Explanatory Memorandum asserts that this provision "does not prevent fee
sharing arrangements between lawyers on a proper basis" and explains that
in some Member States a lawyers can retain a commission.17  Thus, this
provision may have less bite than first appears and may be much closer to a
"conflicts of law" approach since the CCBE Explanatory Memorandum
acknowledges that in some Member States a lawyer may receive a state-
166. The editor of the CCBE Compendium has suggested that it would not be correct for a lawyer
to place another lawyer in the difficult situation of having to read a letter in order to learn that it is
confidential and then act as if that lawyer never learned the confidential information. A solution
which she has used is to send a cover letter asking if the second lawyer was at liberty to read her
correspondence and maintain its confidentiality. If so, the cover letter instructed the second lawyer
to open the enclosed sealed envelope. If not, the lawyer was instructed not to open the second
envelope. Letter from Dorothy Margaret Donald-Little to Laurel S. Terry, author (July 18, 1992)(on
file with author).
167. CCBE CODE Rule 5.1.
168. CCBE CODE Rule 5.2.
169. CCBE CODE Rule 5.2.
170. CCBE CODE Rule 5.4.
171. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 5.4.
1993]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
sanctioned referral fee. An exception consistent with this comment presum-
ably would be necessary before the original lawyer and the substitution
lawyer discussed earlier could split a fee.
CCBE Rule 5.5 is entitled "Communication with Opposing Parties" and
directs that a "lawyer shall not communicate about a particular case or
matter directly with any person whom he knows to be represented or
advised in the case or matter by another lawyer, without the consent of that
other lawyer (and shall keep the other lawyer informed of any such
communications)."'' 72 This rule is thus analogous to the ABA's Model Rule
4.2, although the topical issue in the United States concerning how to apply
this rule to an organizational client is not addressed.1 73 Unlike the comment
to the Model Rules, the commentary concerning CCBE Rule 5.5 explicitly
acknowledges that it is designed not only for the protection of the opposing
parties, but also "to promote the smooth conduct of business between
"y1 74lawyers ....
Both CCBE Rules 5.6 and 5.7 of the deal with fee-related issues. CCBE
Rule 5.6 indicates that when a lawyer is taking over a case for another
lawyer, the new lawyer shall not begin to act before ascertaining that
arrangements have been made for the settlement of the first lawyer's
fees. 17 ' According to one of the drafters, this provision required consider-
able discussion before it was adopted. 176 The issue of primary concern was
the extent of responsibility, if any, a succeeding lawyer had to ensure that
the prior lawyer was paid.1 77 The compromise adopted by the CCBE Code
172. CCBE CODE Rule 5.5.
173. In the case of an organization, Model Rule 5.5 prohibits communications by a lawyer for one
party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization and with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that
matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil Or Criminal liability or whose
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 cmt.
At least one court has stated the purpose of the rule is not "to protect a corporate party from the
revelation of prejudicial facts .... [but] to preclude the interviewing of those corporate employees
who have the authority to bind the corporation." Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569
(Wash. 1984). However, it seems the rule is applied differently in different situations. Compare
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990)
(holding that a lawyer may not interview former employees of opposing company without consent of
opposing counsel) and Niesig v. Team 1, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that a lawyer may not
interview any current employees of defendant corporation without consent of corporation's
counsel) with Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc. v. State, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
a lawyer may speak exparte with employees of opponent other than officers, directors, or managing
agents) and Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that a lawyer may
interview employees of opponent without opposing counsel's consent in an employment bias case).
174. CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, Rule 5.5.
175. CCBE CODE Rule 5.6. This is particularly problematic because in some jurisdictions before a
lawyer may take on a case, the lawyer has a duty to ensure that the prior lawyer was paid.
176. Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678, 684.
177. Id.
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permits the new lawyer to take any required urgent steps which are
necessary to protect the interests of the client, provided, however, that the
second lawyer informs the first lawyer of this fact.' 7 8 CCBE Rule 5.7, unlike
CCBE Rule 5.6, does not deal with the successive-lawyer situation. Rather,
it deals with the situation in which a lawyer assists a client to retain
additional counsel. CCBE Rule 5.7 adopted the Declaration of Perugia rule
establishing the circumstances under which a lawyer who brings in another
lawyer on a case is responsible for the new lawyer's fees.
179
CCBE Rule 5.8, which is titled "Training Young Lawyers," is essentially a
nondiscrimination exhortation. Framed in nonmandatory terms, the rule
states that the members of the legal profession in the European Community
should take into account the need of the profession to have lawyers trained
in different member states when considering training issues. 180
CCBE Rule 5.9, the final rule in this section, indicates that if a lawyer
believes that a colleague has breached a rule of professional conduct or if a
professional dispute arises, the lawyer should first contact this colleague
and attempt to resolve the dispute.' 8 ' If the dispute cannot be resolved, this
rule then requires the lawyer to notify the bar associations before beginning
any proceedings so that the associations may attempt to facilitate a settle-
ment. '
In sum, with the exception of CCBE Rule 5.3, which deals with conflicting
rules about the confidentiality of correspondence between lawyers, the
topics addressed in this section are not particularly ground-breaking. Most
of these rules concern either issues of money and finances or cooperation
and collegiality. What may be most unexpected to an American is the extent
to which this code unabashedly acknowledges its intent to protect the
lawyer's own interests. And this lack of embarrassment may, in turn, reflect
a different way of thinking about the lawyer's role.
6. Conclusion
The introductory paragraph of this article referred to what ultimately may
be the situation of a German lawyer wishing to practice in France. Ulti-
mately, a German lawyer practicing in France may be subject to fewer
conflicting ethical rules than a New Jersey lawyer practicing in the District
of Columbia. The reason why cross-border practice may eventually be easier
in Europe is that the European Community has expressed an interest in
178. CCBE CODE Rule 5.6.
179. CCBE CODE Rule 5.7; see also DECLARATION OF PERUGIA, supra note 28, art. VI, § 4.
180. CCBE CODE Rule 5.8. This provision also was the topic of some discussion during the
drafting stage. See Toulmin, supra note 4, at 678.
181. CCBE CODE Rule 5.9.
182. Id.
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developing a standard code of ethics which "harmonizes"' 83 the previous
ethics rules of each country. This EC interest in harmonizing the ethics
rules that will be used in the Member States contrasts with the approach
used in the United States, in which the ethical regulation of lawyers occurs
on a state-wide basis rather than a national basis, and in which there seems
to be very little discussion of the need to standardize the ethical rules in all
States. Indeed, since the promulgation of the Model Rules in 1983, there has
probably been less standardization than there was previously.184
Although a lawyer in the European Community may ultimately be subject
to fewer conflicting ethical rules than a American lawyer, at the moment
significant barriers exist for an European Community lawyer who wants to
practice in a different Member State. Some of the barriers that face an
European Community lawyer wanting to practice in a different Member
State are a result of the substantive European Community law.' 85 But at
least one of the barriers facing an European Community lawyer hoping to
engage in a cross-border practice occurs because a lawyer who originally
183. As explained earlier, one of the listed purposes of the CCBE Code is that it be taken into
account in all revisions of national rules of deontology or professional practice with a view of their
progressive "harmonization." See supra note 72. "Harmonization" is the process through which the
European Community develops a uniform set of standards applicable to all Member States. See
generally BERMAN, supra note 37, at 428-441.
The CCBE, however, does not appear to be unequivocally in support of "harmonization" of legal
ethics rules. There are repeated references that the legal ethics codes are a result of particular legal
systems and that one cannot harmonize the legal ethics codes without streamlining all the legal
systems, which is not necessarily desirable. Compare Toulmin, supra note 4, at 677 (stressing that the
rules of of a jurisdiction should not be taken out of context, nor should an attempt be made to give
general application to rules which inherently are incapable of such application) with Goebel,
Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 4, at 561, 602-03 (noting the changes in national
rules regarding lawyers which have occurred in the recent past). Recently, the EC has authorized
the use of "mutual recognition" in lieu of "harmonization," in which a Member State may be
required to recognize the requirements of another Member State and treat them as equivalent to
their own. See BERMAN, supra note 37, at 441.
184. The lack of "harmonization" in the U.S. is readily apparent by contrasting the states'
adoption of the Model Rules with the adoption of the Model Code. Compare Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct 1:11-43 (ABA/BNA) (1992) (summarizing each state's version of the Model Rules) with
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §2.6.3, at 56-57 (Practitioner's ed. 1986)(noting that
the initial version of the Model Code was adopted almost in toto by the vast majority of states).
The author views this lack of "harmonization" in the ethics rules as a positive sign of the
increasing sophistication (and resulting debate) about these issues. However, while this lack of
harmonization provides for a fuller development of the issues and the debate, it does create
problems for practitioners. See generally ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of
Violation of Rules of Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States,
45 Bus. LAW. 1229 (1990); Stanley Kaplan, Professional Responsibilty: Which State's Rules Apply?,
INSIGHTS, Feb. 1988, at 17 (explaining why there is no "harmony" in the Model Rules).
185. For a discussion of the issues raised under substantive European Community law concerning
a lawyer's right to engage in cross-border practice, see supra note 4, and the discussion in Part II of
this article, forthcoming, concerning the relationship of CCBE Rule 2.4 to substantive European
Community law.
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was licensed in one state, but is now practicing in another state, may be
subject to multiple, and perhaps conflicting, ethical systems.
The CCBE Code represents an attempt to deal with this barrier that is
created by having a lawyer subject to multiple ethics codes. Despite the fact
that the CCBE Code has not "harmonized" the legal ethics rules from all
Member States so as to provide substantive provisions governing all issues,
the CCBE Code has, in essence, attempted to harmonize the "conflicts of
law" choices facing a lawyer. It has attempted (although not always success-
fully) to provide clear rules stating in which situations a lawyer's "Home
State" ethics rule governs and in which situations a lawyer's "Host State"
ethics rule governs. Thus, to use the terminology of the CCBE Code itself, it
has attempted to avoid the "double deontology" [conflicting codes] problem
without providing a single deontology. While not an ideal solution, the
combination of substantive "legal ethics" provisions and "conflicts of law"
provisions used in the CCBE Code certainly appears to be a step in the right
direction.
VI. ANALYZING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CCBE CODE PROVISIONS: Do
THE MODEL RULES AND THE CCBE CODE CONCEPTUALIZE THE ROLE
OF THE ATTORNEY DIFFERENTLY?
The preceding section of this article contained a section-by-section
analysis of the CCBE Code provisions and noted those instances where the
CCBE Code provisions differ from the Model Rules provisions. While this
information may be interesting to legal ethics scholars (and possibly useful
to lawyers involved in European Community matters), the earlier analysis is
ultimately not particularly satisfying. One is left with a dry listing of what the
state of the law is without any sense about why the European Community
ethics code evolved as it did and why it differs from Model Rules in some
instances but not all.
In analyzing the similarities and differences between the Model Rules
provisions and the CCBE Code provisions, the similarities and differences
between the two might well be attributable to differing ways of conceptual-
izing the role of the lawyer.
These broad-brush generalizations are speculative. However, to the
extent that substantive differences exist between the content of the Model
Rules and the CCBE Code, this type of broad-based approach, however
speculative, may provide a first step toward understanding why in certain
situations the two ethical standards adopted different rules. It is in this
spirit, then, that the following comments are offered.
This article cites two different kinds of authority in support of the thesis
that underlying the Model Rules and the CCBE Code are different ways of
thinking about the role of the lawyer. First, it cites the "General Principle of
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Independence" set forth in CCBE Rule 2.1, as a vehicle for better introduc-
ing the theory about the different ways in which the role of the lawyer is
conceptualized.
1 86
After using CCBE Rule 2.1's "General Principle of Independence" to
articulate this thesis, this article reviews a number of specific provisions -
some of which might be considered to be "important" and some not -
which support this thesis about the different ways in which the Model Rules
and the CCBE Code envision the role of the lawyer.
A. THE THESIS: USING CCBE RULE 2.1 TO ARTICULATE THE DIFFERING
CONCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
In analyzing whether the CCBE Code and the Model Rules have different
conceptualizations of the role of the lawyer, CCBE Rule 2.1 regarding
"Independence" provides a useful starting point. Rule 2.1 provides as
follows:
2.1.1 The many duties to which a lawyer is subject require his absolute
independence, free from all other influence, especially such as may arise
from his personal interests or external pressure. Such independence is as
necessary to trust in the process of justice as the impartiality of the judge.
A lawyer must therefore avoid any impairment of his independence and
be careful not to compromise his professional standards in order to please his
client, the court or third parties.
2.1.2 This independence is necessary in non-contentious matters as well as
in litigation. Advice given by a lawyer to his client has no value if it is given
only to ingratiate himself, to serve his personal interests or in response to
outside pressure.
187
Most United States lawyers probably would assert that their professional
obligation is to please their clients. When most American lawyers describe
the limits which exist on their behavior, they might well speak in terms of
lawyers not compromising their professional standards by forgetting their
duty to the court or to the legal system in general. Most United States
lawyers likely would not speak in terms of being careful not to compromise
their professional standards in order to please their clients. Thus, this
slightly different emphasis, which is illustrated by the CCBE Rule 2.1
principle of "Independence" may reflect a very different way of thinking
about the lawyer-client relationship.
188
186. CCBE CODE Rule 2.1.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Professor Goebel has described this difference in the role of the lawyer and the different
emphasis given in the CCBE Code and the Model Rules as "striking." Goebel, Lawyers in the
European Community, supra note 4, at 644.
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An explanation is necessary. It is a truism often repeated in the United
States that a lawyer is a "hired gun." In the last ten years, there has been a
concerted movement to get away from this language and the "no holds
barred" mentality it may encourage.' 8 9 Thus, for example, the Model Rules
have deleted the language requiring a lawyer to "zealously represent" a
client, and there has been a concerted effort in the secondary literature and
in the courts to emphasize the requirement that a lawyer's representation
must be within the bounds of the law. 9 ' (For example, there is a growing
consensus that a lawyer must report perjury by a client.) Despite this change
of emphasis and language, one suspects that even those Americans who are
most opposed to the extremes of this "hired gun" mentality nevertheless
think of a lawyer essentially as the client's "hired gun". Although many
interpret the term "hired gun" in a negative sense, no pejorative meaning is
intended here. Rather, this phrase is used in large part because it accurately
captures this author's belief that in the United States, we view the lawyer
essentially as an agent of the client, who hired the lawyer because of the
lawyer's expertise. It is the lawyer's duty to help the client obtain that which
the client is not able to obtain on its own.' 9 1 Although there are clearly
limits on what the lawyer-agent may do on the client's behalf (just as there,
are limits on every agent), the lawyer is functioning only because of the
189. See infra note 190.
190. Compare MODEL CODE DR 7-101 ("Representing a Client Zealously") with MODEL RULES
1.1, 1.2, 1.3 ("Competence," "Scope of Representation," and "Diligence," respectively, omitting
any reference to "zealously").
The change in tone regarding the requirement of "zealous" representation is indicated by the
following excerpt:
Furthermore, the term "zeal" suggests a frame of mind appropriate in advocacy but not
perhaps appropriate in the lawyer's role as advisor. Even when appropriate, the lawyer's
zeal must always respect and defer to those decisions properly reserved to the client.
.... However, a lawyer's zeal must always be tempered so as not to subject parties or
opposing counsel to certain indignities.
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 31:407 (1984).
191. In a trial setting, this means that a lawyer acts as an integral part of the adversary system. See
MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (1979) (examining ethical issues
within the legal profession, particularly with regard to the lawyer as a client representative and the
legal services distribution system). The premises and virtues of the adversary system, as summarized
by Professor Schwartz, are that by vigorous adversarial representation, we provide an opportunity to
discover the truth. In addition, even if the adversarial system is not ideally designed as a vehicle to
elicit the truth, it nevertheless serves the function of validating individuals by permitting them to
vigorously "speak their piece."
The above comments apply most clearly to a lawyer acting in an adversarial adjudicative setting.
However, even when a lawyer is acting as an advisor rather than an advocate, American society
continues to think of the lawyer as an agent of the client who has no authority other than to do that
which the client desires. The lawyer may suggest to the client that the client's desires are
inappropriate, and the lawyer may refuse to do as the client instructs because to do so would be a
violation of the Model Rules or other law, but a lawyer has no authority to go forward with respect to
an objective that has not been approved by the client. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2.
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client and to further the client's interests. Thus, the American legal
community's language is always in terms of "consent" - in almost all
situations which present ethical issues, a lawyer can proceed, if at all, only
by receiving client consent. 92 The client is clearly the master of the
relationship. (One might also notice the semantic change that occurred with
the adoption of the Model Rules: instead of talking about lawyer-client
relationships, the Model Rules now speak of the client-lawyer relationship.)
In essence, then, when an American lawyer acts in a representational
capacity, the lawyer loses the lawyer's separate identity and becomes a
functionary or representative of the client, subject, however, to special
limitations.
The CCBE Code may be based on a different way of thinking about the
lawyer. According to this perspective, the lawyer, even when acting in a
representative capacity, remains an independent being, whose identity is
not collapsed into the identity of the client. As a result, a lawyer has certain
obligations which stem from the mere fact of being a lawyer, as opposed to
obligations that a lawyer assumes because of the lawyer's relationship to a
client. In other words, one can speak of a lawyer's duties in the abstract, as
opposed to the lawyer's duties in relationship to someone else. Or to state it
slightly differently, lawyers owe certain duties to their clients (which are
spelled out in Rule 3 of the CCBE Code) and lawyers owe certain duties to
themselves or their jobs (which are spelled out in Rule 2 of the CCBE
Code.) This approach, in which a lawyer assumes certain obligations simply
by virtue of the lawyer's status, reflects a certain distance between the client
and the lawyer. This distancing might seem recognizable to an American if
one imagines the relationship between Rumpole and his clients or an
English barrister as opposed to a solicitor. 1
93
One might argue that the United States uses a similar approach, in which
a lawyer assumes certain obligations simply by virtue of the lawyer's status
as "an officer of the court." Although there is some truth to this point, this
author would suggest that the "officer of the court" principles are usually
raised in the context of describing what it is a United States lawyer may do
for the lawyer's client. In other words, the dialogue is still framed in terms of
what it is the lawyer does or does not owe the client, as opposed to duties
which lawyers owe to themselves or to their profession.
192. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 31:407-408 (1984); MODEL RULES Rules
1.5-1.9. 1 am indebted to Professor David Luban, who first described the Model Rules as using a
"language of consent," in contrast to the German ethics code's "language of interests." See David
Luban, The Sources of Legal Ethics, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATION-
ALES PR!VATRECHT 246, 264-267 (1984).
193. The fictional Rumpole defends his clients on the BBC television series, Rumpole of the
Bailey.
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It must be emphasized that even if this distancing exists, it does not follow
that a lawyer using this perspective is any less of a vigorous advocate on
behalf of the client.194 One must remember to distinguish between two
separate questions - the questions of the process used and the result
achieved.
With respect to this first question of "process," which is the question
described in this section, one is essentially talking about a decision-making
tree and how lawyers make their decisions (by separating self from client).
The second question, which is not addressed in this section of the article,
focuses on the results of the decision-making tree.
These two issues are distinguishable. Under this "separate identity"
conceptualization of the lawyer, the result may well be (and indeed in many
countries is) that a lawyer is the vigorous advocate of the client and the
lawyer's overarching concern is the duty to the client. But even where the
result (vigorous adversarial advocacy) is the same, it is possible that lawyers
from different countries may have reached the same result using different
processes (or decision-making trees). In other words, even if one assumes
that the lawyer is engaged in rigorous adversary representation, it is possible
for a lawyer to have a different conception of this role and the relationship
to the client than is used in the United States. It may be possible for a lawyer
to vigorously pursue this adversarial role while still maintaining this sense of
separate identity, which offers the lawyer more choices about accepting the
adversary role from the outset.
This distinction between "process" and "result" may help explain an
apparent inconsistency between the writings of Professors Luban and
Ruschemeyer concerning German lawyers. Professor Ruschemeyer had
concluded that in Germany lawyers are more independent from the client
194. This paragraph of the article was added following several conversations I had with Austrian
lawyers about the nature of their work. As an American who primarily had read about, but had not
experienced, the inquisitorial system, I had certain preconceptions about the lawyer's role in an
inquisitorial system. I expected lawyers in an inquisitorial system to think of themselves in less
adversarial terms. This, however, was not my experience. The lawyers I encountered in my very
small sample appeared to think of themselves as just as vigorous an advocate as would an American
adversarial-system lawyer.
My limited experience nonetheless confirms the conclusions of Professor David Luban. In his
study of German legal ethics, he posited that ethics are a function of a country's procedural system
He then concluded that German lawyers were really operating on an adversary system basis,
notwithstanding the traditional comments about "inquisitorial systems." He observed many similari-
ties between the German and United States legal ethics systems with respect to the "nonordinary
duties" or loyalty, confidentiality, and the duty of candor to the court.
Neither my observations, nor Professor Luban's conclusions, however, have undermined my
conclusion that the CCBE Code may reflect a different way of thinking about the role of the lawyer.
This footnote, I believe, addresses the result of a particular approach, whereas my thesis addresses
the reasoning process by which an European Community lawyer may reach the result of being a
vigorous advocate.
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than in the United States.' 95 Professor Luban concluded that German
lawyers use a legal ethics and advocacy perspective which is similar to that
of American lawyers.' 9 6 Both perspectives may in fact be correct because
they may be answering slightly different questions. Professor Ruschemeyer
could be viewed as describing the decision-making tree and how lawyers
make their decisions (by separating themselves from the client). Professor
Luban is talking about the results of the decision-making tree - and the
fact that a German lawyer pursues the interests of the client no less
vigorously than would an American lawyer. The conclusion that Professors
Ruschemeyer and Luban were addressing slightly different questions is
supported by Professor Luban's comments. He observed that German
lawyers consider the same types of issues as American lawyers and generally
reach the same conclusion but present their conclusions in a different way
using this language of interests, rather than a language of consent. Professor
Luban's observation supports the idea that although the result achieved by
German lawyers may be the same, the process by which they reach that
result is often quite different.
Thus, when considering the "decision-making" process and the lawyer's
method of conceptualizing the lawyer-client relationship, it is important to
remember that these comments are not intended to suggest that a Euro-
pean lawyer is ultimately a less vigorous advocate on behalf of the client. If,
however, the CCBE Code reflects a different conceptualization of the
lawyer's role, this perspective may explain those instances where differences
exist between the legal ethics rules of the EC and those of the ABA.
These conclusions are based heavily on the author's research and experi-
ence in Austria. The location of certain provisions within the Austrian legal
ethics code suggests even more strongly than the language in the CCBE
Code a perspective in which a lawyer's separate identity is maintained. '97 At
195. DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY 124-125, 127-131 (1973) (compar-
ing the bar in Germany to the bar in the United States).
196. Luban, supra note 192.
197. In Austria, there are two major sources that regulate lawyers and that might be viewed as
equivalent to the Model Rules. See generally RAO and RL-BA, supra note 114. The first source which
regulates the behavior of Austrian lawyers is a federal statute - the Rechtsanwaltsordnung (RAO).
The Richtlinien (RL-BA) are the second major source that one must consult when looking at
Austrian legal ethics. They are not federal statutes, but are in the nature of administrative
regulations.
The Richtlinien contains three sections or "Artikels." The first Artikel is captioned "Der
Rechtsanwalt und sein Beruf"(which might be loosely translated to mean a lawyer and his
professional activities). The second Artikel is captioned "Der Rechtsanwalt und sein Partei],"
(which might be translated to mean the lawyer and his obligations to his client). The third Artikel is
captioned "Der Rechtsanwalt und sein Stand," (which might be translated to mean the lawyer's
obligation to his profession).
Many of the provisions of the Richtlinien are not located where an American would expect them to
be because substantive rules that we view as primarily for the benefit of the client are not located in
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least in Austria, this way of thinking about a lawyer and his identity probably
has its roots in the development of the legal profession as a "free
profession." '198 However, the comparative legal ethics writings about Ger-
many,1 99 together with the language used in the CCBE Code, suggest that
these observations about a lawyer's way of conceptualizing may not be
limited to Austria but may also explain the way in which the lawyer is viewed
in the CCBE Code.
B. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FROM THE CCBE CODE WHICH MAY ILLUSTRATE
THE THESIS THAT THE CCBE CODE AND MODEL RULES ARE BASED ON
DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
The language of CCBE Rule 2.1 regarding "Independence" provides only
slim evidence for broad generalizations about the differences between the
U.S. and the European way of conceptualizing the lawyer's role. Some of
the specific provisions discussed below may provide additional support for
these differences.
To restate the thesis: in the United States society thinks about the lawyer
primarily as an agent of the client, one who acts because of, and at the
direction of, the client. In other words, the lawyer is a derivative person,
whose duties flow from the client. In contrast, the CCBE Code suggests a
perspective in which lawyers sometimes can be viewed as acting for them-
selves, as opposed to acting as the agents of, and at the direction of, clients.
the Richtlinien section dealing with a lawyer and his client. These different locations reflect implicit
assumptions and values about the persons to whom a duty is owed. By carefully comparing the
organization and location of provisions in the two ethics codes, several differences in the values,
approaches, and assumptions of the American and Austrian codes emerge.
For example, the title of Artikel I of the Richtlinien might be translated as "The Lawyer and His
Job" or "The Lawyer and his Professional Activities." This Artikel contains such requirements as a
lawyer's duty of diligence, duty to honor his obligations, and duty not to improperly influence
witnesses. It is interesting to note, however, that these duties do not appear in Artikel II, which is
captioned "The Lawyer and his Client." In contrast to this organization, the Model Rules do not
differentiate between duties owed to a client and duties owed to oneself as a lawyer. Thus, the duties
of diligence and competence appear in Article 1 of the Model Rules, which governs the "Client-
Lawyer Relationship." In other words, whereas the Richtlinien place these duties in Artikel I, the
Model Rules place these obligations in what appears to be the counterpart to Artikel II. Compare
MODEL RULES Rule 1 with RICHTLINIEN, supra note 114, arts. I, II, reprinted in RECHTSANWALTSORD-
NUNG, supra note 114, at 172-75.
198. When I first taught for a summer in Austria, one of the concepts that seemed most foreign to
me was the emphasis on describing lawyers as a "free profession." Indeed, the Austrian legal ethics
rules have several references to the fact that the Austrian lawyers are part a "free profession."
Moreover, this concept appears to be a living one, used in the language of lawyers as a way of
identifying themselves. (The term "free profession" reflects the change from a system in which
lawyers were civil servants who worked for, and were subject to, government control, to a system in
which lawyers work independent of the state and are thus a "free profession.") See generally ERNST
LOHSING & RUDOLF BRAUN, OSTERRIECHISCtiES ANWALTSRECHT (2d ed. 1950).
199. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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According to this perspective, the lawyer is sometimes perceived as an
independent being who has rights and duties which do not necessarily
derive from the client. By analyzing the differences in the conceptualization
of the attorney-client relationship, this thesis may help to explain many of
the substantive differences between the CCBE Code and the Model Rules.
For example, these differing views of the role of the lawyer might be used
to explain the different approaches one sees to the issue of "substituted
lawyers." In the United States, a lawyer would need the client's consent
before retaining another lawyer (outside the lawyer's firm) to handle the
client's affairs."'° The American rationale for this consent requirement is
presumably that the lawyer is acting only as an agent of the client and that it
is the client's decision whether and when to use additional lawyers.201 In
some EC countries, however, it is possible for a lawyer who is unable to
make a court appointment to engage a "substitution lawyer" to handle that
particular appearance.20 2 Furthermore, no consent is required for this
substitution and, indeed, the client may never know that such a substitution
occurred because bills can be written in such a way as to obscure this fact.20 3
This author submits that the CCBE Code permits this substitution without
client consent because a scheduling conflict which requires a lawyer to
obtain a substitute is viewed as an issue that is the lawyer's business, rather
than the client's business.2" In this perspective, the lawyer's business is not
always derivative from the client's business. In other words, one could argue
200. The necessity for client consent before retaining another lawyer is demonstrated by a review
of the Model Rules Rule 1.5(e) (requiring client consent before a division of fees with a lawyer in
another firm can occur) and Rule 1.6 (setting forth a lawyer's duty of confidentiality). Unless a
lawyer is "impliedly authorized" to reveal a client's confidences to a lawyer in another firm, Rule 1.6
effectively requires the lawyer to obtain the client's consent before retaining a lawyer not within the
firm. None of the specific examples in the commentary following Rule 1.6 indicates that this type of
disclosure was intended to be covered by the "implied authorization" language. MODEL RULE Rule
1.6 cmt. The conclusion that client consent is necessary is supported by the secondary authorities.
See, e.g., Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:501-504 (1984) ("A lawyer who, for one
reason or another, has stopped representing a client may not, simply on his own initiative, reveal the
client's confidences to the client's new attorney. Although there may be exceptions when a client's
fraud is involved, the basic rule is that the first lawyer must obtain the former client's consent before
he reveals anything to the substitute lawyer."); 1 GEOFFREY HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.6:201-05 (2d ed. Supp. 1992) (no comparable illustration listed).
201. This premise appears to be so basic to our system that virtually no discussion of this point is
required. See, e.g., MODEL RULES ANN. 82-4. This lengthy discussion concerning the "Legal
Background" of the fee sharing provision in Rule 1.5(e) explained in one sentence the requirement
of client consent ("While the client must be advised of the arrangement and approve of the lawyer's
participation in the representation, the lawyer is not required to disclose the particular allocation"),
but required many sentences to explain and justify the requirements that the total fee be reasonable
and that all lawyers assume joint responsibility for the representation when the fee is not
proportional. Id.
202. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
203. CCBE CODE Rule 5.6; see supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
204. The substitution practice may also reflect the fact that in many civilian inquisitorial systems,
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that the lawyer is viewed as independent of the client, having an interest and
"business" which need not be viewed as the "business" or concern of the
client.
These differing conceptions of a lawyer also may help to explain the
differences between the Model Rules and the CCBE Code on the issue of
whether a lawyer may have ex parte contacts with a judge. While such
contact is prohibited in the United States, it is not prohibited in all Member
States and CCBE Rule 4.2 permits these exparte contacts.2 °5 One explana-
tion for this difference could be that in the Unites States, a lawyer who
speaks with a judge about a case is viewed as doing so on behalf of the client,
i.e., as an agent of the client. Because of this view of due process, it would be
unfair for a judge to hear only one client's perspective. Therefore, the
American legal community historically has banned ex parte contacts. 20 6 In
contrast, if one views the lawyer not necessarily as only an agent of the
client, but as an independent, trustworthy being, it is easier to justify a rule
which permits such exparte contacts unless they are "unfair."
The existence of this difference in approaches might also be supported by
the fact that the Model Rules and the CCBE Code seem to be worried about
very different kinds of conflicts of interest. While one could argue for
labelling other provisions as "conflict of interest" provisions, there are five
CCBE Code provisions which are the key "conflicts of interest" provisions.
These five provisions include:
1) the requirement in CCBE Rule 2.7 that a lawyer "must put [the client's]
interests before his own interests or those of fellow members of the legal
profession;"
20 7
2) the requirements of CCBE Rule 3.2 which forbid a lawyer from
much of what occurs happens in writing. Thus, the identity of the particular lawyer who shows up
may not be as important as in the United States.
205. CCBE CODE Rule 4.2.
206. Model Code DR 7-110(B); see also Model Rule 3.5 which provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means
prohibited by law;
(b) communicate exparte with such a person except as permitted by law; or,
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
MODEL RULES Rule 3.5. The Comment elaborates, "The advocate's function is to present evidence
and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or
obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants." Id. cmt.
It is interesting to note that the rule does not prohibit ex parte contacts that are "permitted by
law." Thus, it is necessary for an attorney to look at case law and court rules to ascertain whether
certain ex parte communications are appropriate. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) ("Temporary
Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration"); In re Jordan, 652 P.2d 1268 (Or. 1982) (holding
statutory procedure authorized exparte application for temporary restraining order).
207. CCBE CODE Rule 2.7.
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advising, representing, or acting on behalf "of two or more clients in the
same matter" and from accepting a new client "if there is a risk of a
breach of confidences entrusted to the lawyer by a former client or if the
knowledge which the lawyer possesses of the affairs of the former client
would give an undue advantage to the new client;"
20 8
3) CCBE Rule 2.5 which requires a lawyer to comply with the applicable
rules regarding "Incompatible Occupations;,
20 9
4) CCBE Rule 3.3 forbidding contingency fees;2 '0 and
5) CCBE Rule 1.4 which adopts a definition of the "lawyers" to whom the
CCBE Code applies and excludes, in many countries, "house counsel.,
211
The number and the nature of these conflicts of interest provisions are very
different from the number and nature of the conflicts of interest provisions
in the Model Rules.212 First, the general conflicts provisions in the CCBE
208. CCBE CODE Rule 3.2.
209. CCBE CODE Rule 2.5.
210. CCBE CODE Rule 3.3.
211. CCBE CODE Rule 1.4.
212. The major conflict of interest section states:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client ....
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation ....
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account
based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation ....
(f) A lawyer shall-not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than
the client ....
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients ... unless each client consents
after consultation ....
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented
in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or
former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation
is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not
represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation
regarding the relationship.
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client ....
MODEL RULES Rule 1.8; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule);
MODEL RULES Rule 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client); MODEL RULES Rule 1.10 (Imputed
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Code might seem rather inadequate to an American. The general rule, for
example, says nothing about avoiding influence from third parties.2 3 More-
over, by providing such absolute, black and white rules, which have no
provision for consultation and consent of the client, the CCBE Code may be
providing less protection to the client.21 4
What is most interesting, though, about these conflicts provisions is the
matters which are covered by specific rules rather than the general provi-
sions. The CCBE Code and the Model Rules are worried about, and want to
specifically regulate, very different things. Two of the three topics which are
covered by specific regulation in the CCBE Code (the house counsel215 and
contingency fees rules216) involve issues that are perceived to be important
in order to maintain the lawyer's independence and distance from the
client. As explained above,21 7 one of the concerns behind these prohibitions
is that the lawyer will identify too much with the client and that this
identification in turn will compromise the lawyer's independence and
judgment. Indeed, the third topic covered by a specific rule, incompatible
professions, probably stems as much from concerns about the reputation
and view of the profession as it does from concerns about protecting the
client because of a lawyer's conflict of interest.
With respect to specific "conflict of interest" provisions that are not
included in the CCBE Code, as opposed to those that are, the CCBE Code
simply does not have the plethora of rules which tell the lawyer how to
behave when faced with situations which may tempt the lawyer. Thus, for
example, there is no rule in the CCBE Code which tells the lawyer in which
situations the lawyer may receive a bequest from a will the lawyer drafted;
no rule which regulates a lawyer's book contract about a case; no rule
regulating the conditions under which a lawyer and a client may enter into a
business deal together.218 In short, the silence of the CCBE Code reflects
more trust in the judgment of the lawyer and the lawyer's ability to resist
temptation. In contrast to the ABA's concerns, the conflicts that the CCBE
Code worries about are not the specific temptations a lawyer may face, but
situations that compromise the lawyer's independence and distance from
the client.
Disqualification: General Rule); MODEL RULES Rule 1.11 (Successive Government and Private
Employment); MODEL RULES Rule 1.12 (Former Judge or Arbitrator); MODEL RULES Rule 3.7
(Lawyer as Witness).
213. Compare CCBE CODE Rule 3.2 (Conflict of Interest) with MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b)
(Conflict of Interest: General Rule).
214. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 68-70 and 124-30 and accompanying text.
218. But see supra note 206.
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The CCBE Code and the Model Rules also differ in their treatment of
rules that are promulgated for the benefit of lawyers in three concrete ways.
The first difference is a difference in attitude towards provisions that are
promulgated for the benefit of lawyers. The American legal community
often embodies a sense of embarrassment with respect to rules that are
adopted for the benefit of the legal profession or lawyers. American
practitioners have tended to reject the notion that a personal benefit may
constitute a legitimate purpose which can override the interests of the
client, the court, or the public.
2 19
In contrast to the American attitude towards rules which benefit lawyers,
the CCBE Code reveals a distinct lack of embarrassment. While this lack of
embarrassment may be due to a lack of being challenged, it may also be due
to the different conception of the role of the lawyer underlying the CCBE
Code. If the lawyer is viewed as a trustworthy, independent being (i.e., a
member of a free profession 22 °), it may then be appropriate to have rules
which protect this person.221 (One might argue that Americans may be
moving in the direction exemplified by this European attitude, namely that
it is permissible to have ethics rules which protect the interests of lawyers.
Many of the provisions in the ABA's Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism
222
and other professionalism codes which have been recently adopted, 3
arguably are provisions designed to protect the interests of lawyers. This
may now be viewed as legitimate as it helps avoid a breakdown in the legal
system and ultimately redounds to the benefit of the public and the clients.)
The second difference that appears in the ABA and CCBE ethics codes'
219. For a critique of American ethics rules as serving the lawyers' own interests, see Stephen
Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate
Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 147 (1981); see also Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The
Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
220. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
221. Protection of the profession may also be viewed as ultimately redounding to the benefit of
the client. See Letter from D.M. Donald-Little, to Laurel Terry, author (July 9, 1992) (on file with
author).
222. LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988) reprinted in THOMAS MORGAN & RONALD
ROTUNDA, 1993 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 595 (1993) (not adopted
by the ABA House of Delegates). The Creed's Preamble provides:
As a lawyer I must strive to make our system of justice work fairly and efficiently. In order
to carry out that responsibility, not only will I comply with the letter and spirit of the
disciplinary standards applicable to all lawyers, but I will also conduct myself in accordance
with the following Creed of Professionalism when dealing with my client, opposing parties,
their counsel, the courts and the general public.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Ky. BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY and STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX., reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 1993 568-570 (1993).
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treatment of rules designed for the protection of lawyers is organizational
- the CCBE Code has an entire category of provisions expressly dealing
with relations between lawyers.124 The Model Rules have no separate
category for these types of rules.225
One might well disagree with this last statement and argue that Model
Rules Article 8, titled "Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession, ' 226 is
comparable to the "Relations Between Lawyers" section of the CCBE
Code.227 However, one will notice a difference when one compares the
subsections contained in CCBE Rule 5 (Corporate Spirit of the Profession,
Co-operation among Lawyers of Different Member States, Correspondence
between Lawyers, Referral Fees, Communication with Opposing Parties,
Change of Lawyer, Responsibility for Fees Training Young Lawyers, and
Disputes amongst Lawyers in Different Member States) with the provisions
contained under Model Rules Article 8 (a duty to be truthful in bar
admission and disciplinary matters, an obligation to judges, a duty to report
misconduct, acts which constitutes misconduct, and jurisdiction). As an
example, one can compare the "Duty to Report" obligation in the Model
Rules228 with the "Disputes amongst Lawyers in Different Member States"
provisions in CCBE Rule 5.9.29 In determining the beneficiary of the
provisions of the ABA's Article 8, most often one would decide that these
provisions were adopted for the benefit of the public at large. Thus, for
example, the justification of the Model Rules' requirement that lawyers
report abuses by other lawyers to the bar association is based on the public's
right to protect the public by having a self-regulatory bar that works.230 The
concern is not just to remedy a particular situation but to locate the "bad
apple" lawyers so that future clients will be protected.
While one might similarly conclude that the CCBE Code's "reporting"
provision is designed to protect the public, this conclusion is less clear.
CCBE Rule 5.9.1 requires a lawyer who thinks that a colleague has breached
a rule of ethics to draw it to the attention of the colleague.231 CCBE Rule
5.9.2 indicates that if a personal dispute of a professional nature arises, the
224. CCBE CODE Rules 5.1-5.8. For a discussion of these provisions, see supra Part V.B.5.
225. The Model Rules certainly have individual provisions that address a lawyer's relationship
with other lawyers. The Model Rules, however, do not have an entire section or category devoted to
such rules. See generally MODEL RULES.
226. MODEL RULES Rules 8.1-8.5.
227. CCBE CODE Section 5.
228. MODEL RULES Rule 8.3.
229. CCBE CODE Rule 5.9.
230. The first sentence of the Comment to Model Rule 8.3 explains this purpose as follows:
"Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary
investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct." MODEL RULES
Rule 8.3 cmt.
231. CCBE CODE Rule 5.9.1.
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lawyers should try to settle it in a friendly way.2 32 CCBE Rule 5.9.3 prohibits
a lawyer from commencing "any form of proceedings" against a colleague
without first informing their bar associations in order to allow the Bars "an
opportunity to assist in reaching a settlement. 2 33 It is possible to view these
provisions not as provisions designed to protect the public, but instead as
rules which are designed to protect the interests of the lawyers involved by
resolving disputes and handling problems confidentially and amongst the
lawyers themselves. This observation is reinforced by the location of these
rules in a section that is titled "relations among lawyers."
The third and final difference in the ABA and CCBE treatment of rules
designed to protect lawyers arises the way in which the Model Rules and the
CCBE Rules categorize certain multilateral relationships. In transactions
where there is a multilateral relationship (e.g., a relationship among the
lawyer, the lawyer's client, and the opposing lawyer or client), the CCBE
Code is more likely to focus on the lawyer's relationship with opposing
counsel.234 In contrast to this perspective, the American rules are usually
analyzed either in terms of the lawyer's relationship with the client or the
lawyer's obligations to the opposing client. American rules of ethics are
rarely couched in terms of a lawyer's obligation to another lawyer. Even
when one suspects that an American ethics rule was promulgated in order
to further the interests of the legal profession or lawyers, one rarely sees this
purpose explicitly stated.
Model Rule 4.1 provides a concrete example. The Comment to Rule 4.1,
which governs a lawyer's conduct during negotiations with an opposing
party, focuses on the rights of the opposing clients and the lawyer's
relationship with these individuals.235 In the CCBE Code, this topic of the
appropriate tactics during negotiation acknowledges the lawyer's interest as
one interest of the rule.
236
232. CCBE CODE Rule 5.9.2.
233. CCBE CODE Rule 5.9.3.
234. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. A somewhat analogous example is provided not in
the CCBE Code itself, but by examining the treatment of confidentiality in some Member States. In
some States, confidences belong to the lawyer, rather than the client, and thus may not be waived by
the client. See Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community, supra note 4, at 630; see generally
EDWARD, supra note 97.
235. Rule 4.1 states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6 [Confidentiality of Information].
MODEL RULES Rule 4.1.
236. CCBE Rule 5.5 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not communicate about a particular case or
matter directly with any person whom he knows to be represented or advised in the case or matter by
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In sum, there are several significant differences between the CCBE Code
and the Model Rules. While it may be enough to simply note these differ-
ences and move on, it may also be possible to explain these differences by
considering whether there is a subtly different conception of the lawyer that
underlies the CCBE Code of Conduct and the ABA Model Rules. If one
understands the perspective from which ethics rules emanate, one will
better understand and untangle the differences between these rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
The CCBE Code presents the classic example of the half-full glass. One
can either be quite optimistic and impressed with the progress that has been
made in such a short time, or one can be pessimistic, focusing on the
number and nature of the differences and disagreements that must still be
overcome before European lawyers truly operate under a single harmo-
nized legal ethics code. At the moment, it is probably not fair to say that a
German lawyer interested in practicing law in France faces fewer ethical
dilemmas posed by a multi-state practice (i.e. double deontology) than does
a New Jersey lawyer interested in practicing in the District of Columbia.
While Model Rule 8.5 continues to resist a clear resolution, it is nevertheless
clear that the jurisdictional issues raised by the CCBE Code are at least
equally, and probably much more, difficult to resolve. One thing is clear,
however. There is an interest in Europe in harmonizing the codes of legal
ethics of many very diverse legal professions and legal traditions. And there
is talk of adding additional, former East Bloc Countries to the CCBE as
Observer States.237 The collective American legal community should watch
this movement carefully and with interest. 38 Who knows? In the future the
United States may be asked to join a community of world attorneys who
share a single legal ethics code. It certainly behooves all American attorneys
to understand where the CCBE Code differs from the legal ethics codes in
the United States and to try to understand why these differences might
exist.
another lawyer, without the consent of that other lawyer (and shall keep the other lawyer informed
of any such communications)." CCBE CODE Rule 5.5; see also CCBE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM,
supra note 45, Rule 5.5.
237. In October, 1991, EC Commission President Delors told the EC to prepare for a Community
of 24 or even 30 members, in view of the breakup of the East Bloc. See RICHARD OWEN & MICHAEL
DYNES, THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 287 (1992). Regardless of whether this occurs, it should be
noted that there already are liaisons between the bars of various East Block countries and the bars
of certain CCBE Member or Observer States, and there is a CCBE Committee responsible for issues
related to East Block Countries. See CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 21.
238. The ABA has appointed a committee, which is responsible for acting as liaison with the
CCBE and for examining the Model Rules in light of possible harmonization with the CCBE Code.
See CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, ch. 3, at 34-37. Indeed, one of the drafters of the CCBE Code
has suggested that it could serve as the basis for a code among GATT nations or as the basis of an
universal code. See Toulmin, supra note 4, at 675, 685.
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APPENDIX A
A COMPARISON OF THE CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT
WITH THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
PREPARED BY LAUREL S. TERRY
CCBE RULE COMPARABLE MODEL RULE
1.1 - The Function of the Lawyer in The Preamble of the ABA Model
Society Rules
1.2 - The Nature of Rules of The "Scope" section of the ABA Model
Professional Conduct Rules
1.3 - The Purpose of the Code The "Scope" section of the ABA Model
Rules
1.4 - Field of Application Ratione No counterpart
Personae
1.5 - Field of Application Ratione No direct counterpart; see Rule 8.5
Materiae
1.6 - Definitions The "Terminology" section of the ABA
Model Rules
2.1 - Independence Rule 1.7, Rule 2.1
2.2 - Trust & Personal Integrity No direct counterpart; see Rule 1.7,
Rule 8.4
2.3 - Confidentiality Rule 1.6; see also Rule 3.3, Rule
2.4 - Respect for the Rules of Other
Bars
1.2(d)(and in some states Rule 4.1)
which may override Rule 1.6




2.5 - Incompatible Occupations
2.6 - Personal Publicity
2.7 - The Client's Interests
3.1 - Acceptance & Termination of
Instructions
3.2 - Conflict of Interest
3.3 - Pactum de Quota Litis
[Contingency Fees]
3.4 - Regulation of Fees
3.5 - Payment on Account
3.6 - Fee Sharing [with Non-lawyers]
3.7 - Legal Aid
3.8 - Clients' Funds [with audit
provision]
3.9 - Professional Indemnity
Insurance
4.1 - Applicable Rules of Conduct in
Court
4.2 - Fair Conduct of Proceedings
4.3 - Demeanor in Court
COMPARABLE MODEL RULE
No direct counterpart; see Rule 1.7(b),
Rule 1.13, and Rule 5.4(c)
Rules 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5
Rule 1.7(b), Rule 1.8
Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and Rule 1.16
Rule 1.7, Rule 1.8(b), Rule 1.9, and
Rule 1.10; see also Rule 1.11 and
Rule 1.12
Rule 1.5(c) & (d)
Rule 1.5(a)
Rule 1.16(b)(4) & (b)(5); see also Rule
1.15
Rule 5.4(a)




Rule 3.4(c); see also Rule 3.5
Rule 3.5
Rule 3.5(c); see also Rules 3.1, 3.3, and
3.4
1993]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
CCBE RULE
4.4 - False or Misleading
Information
4.5 - Extension to Arbitrators etc.
5.1 - The Corporate Spirit of the
Profession
5.2 - Co-operation among Lawyers
of Different Member States
5.3 - Correspondence between
Lawyers
5.4 - Referral Fees
5.5 - Communication with Opposing
Parties
5.6 - Change of Lawyer
5.7 - Responsibility for Fees
5.8 - Training Young Lawyers
5.9 - Disputes among Lawyers
© 1993, Laurel S. Terry
COMPARABLE MODEL RULE
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COMMUNITY (CCBE CODE)
Rule 1: Preamble
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1.2 - The Nature of Rules of Professional Conduct
1.3 - The Purpose of the Code
1.4 - Field of Application Ratione Personae [defining the category of
professionals to whom the rules apply]
1.5 - Field of Application Ratione Material [defining the cross-border
practice situations in which the rules apply]
1.6 - Definitions
Rule 2: General Principles
2.1 - Independence
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2.3 - Confidentiality
2.4 - Respect for the Rules of Other Bars and Law Societies
2.5 - Incompatible Occupations
2.6 - Personal Publicity [Advertising]
2.7 - The Client's Interests
Rule 3: Relations with Clients
3.1 - Acceptance and Termination of Instructions
3.2 - Conflict of Interest
3.3 - Pactum de Quota Litis [Contingency Fees]
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4.2 - Fair Conduct of Proceedings
4.3 - Demeanor in Court
4.4 - False or Misleading Information
4.5 - Extension to Arbitrators Etc.
Rule 5: Relations Between Lawyers
5.1 - Corporate Spirit of the Profession
5.2 - Co-operation Among Lawyers of Different Member States
5.3 - Correspondence Between Lawyers
5.4 - Referral Fees
5.5 - Communication with Opposing Parties
5.6 - Change of Lawyer
5.7 - Responsibility for Fees
5.8 - Training Young Lawyers
5.9 - Disputes Amongst Lawyers in Different Member States
1. PREAMBLE
1.1. The Function of the Lawyer in Society
In a society founded on respect for the rule of law the lawyer fulfils a special
role. His duties do not begin and end with the faithful performance of what
he is instructed to do so far as the law permits. A lawyer must serve the
interests of justice as well as those whose rights and liberties he is trusted to
assert and defend and it is his duty not only to plead his client's cause but to
be his adviser.
A lawyer's function therefore lays on him a variety of legal and moral
obligations (sometimes appearing to be in conflict with each other) towards:
the client;
the courts and other authorities before whom the lawyer pleads his
client's cause or acts on his behalf;
the legal profession in general and each fellow member of it in particular;
and
the public for whom the existence of a free and independent profession,
bound together by respect for rules made by the profession itself, is an
essential means of safeguarding human rights in face of the power of the
state and other interests in society.
1.2. The Nature of Rules of Professional Conduct
1.2.1. Rules of professional conduct are designed through their willing
acceptance by those to whom they apply to ensure the proper
performance by the lawyer of a function which is recognised as
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essential in all civilised societies. The failure of the lawyer to observe
these rules must in the last resort result in a disciplinary sanction.
1.2.2. The particular rules of each Bar or Law Society arise from its own
traditions. They are adapted to the organisation and sphere of
activity of the profession in the Member State concerned and to its
judicial and administrative procedures and to its national legislation.
It is neither possible nor desirable that they should be taken out of
their context nor that an attempt should be made to give general
application to rules which are inherently incapable of such applica-
tion.
The particular rules of each Bar and Law Society nevertheless are
based on the same values and in most cases demonstrate a common
foundation.
1.3. The Purpose of the Code
1.3.1. The continued integration of the European Community and the
increasing frequency of the cross-border activities of lawyers within
the Community have made necessary in the public interest the
statement of common rules which apply to all lawyers from the
Community whatever Bar or Law Society they belong to in relation to
their cross-border practice. A particular purpose of the statement of
those rules is to mitigate the difficulties which result from the
application of 'double deontology' as set out in Article 4 of the E.C.
Directive 77/249 of 22nd March 1977.
1.3.2. The organisations representing the legal profession through the
CCBE propose that the rules codified in the following articles:
- be recognised at the present time as the expression of a consensus
of all the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community;
- be adopted as enforceable rules as soon as possible in accordance
with national or Community procedures in relation to the cross-
border activities of the lawyer in the European Community;
- be taken into account in all revisions of national rules of deontol-
ogy or professional practice with a view to their progressive
harmonisation.
They further express the wish that the national rules of deontology or
professional practice be interpreted and applied wherever possible in
a way consistent with the rules in this Code.
After the rules in this Code have been adopted as enforceable rules
in relation to his cross-border activities the lawyer will remain bound
to observe the rules of the Bar or Law Society to which he belongs to
the extent that they are consistent with the rules in this Code.
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1.4. Field of Application Ratione Personae
The following rules shall apply to lawyers of the European Community as
they are defined by the Directive 77/249 of 22nd March 1977.
1.5. Field of Application Ratione Materiae
Without prejudice to the pursuit of a progressive harmonisation of rules of
deontology or professional practice which apply only internally within a
Member State, the following rules shall apply to the cross-border activities
of the lawyer within the European Community. Cross-border activities shall
mean:
(a) all professional contacts with lawyers of Member States other than his
own; and
(b) the professional activities of the lawyer in a Member State other than




'Home Member State' means the Member State of the Bar or Law
Society to which the lawyer belongs.
'Host Member State' means any other Member State where the lawyer
carries on cross-border activities.
'Competent authority' means the professional organization(s) or authori-
ty(ies) of the Member State concerned responsible for the laying down of




2.1.1. The many duties to which a lawyer is subject require his absolute
independence, free from all other influence, especially such as may
arise from his personal interests or external pressure. Such indepen-
dence is as necessary to trust in the process of justice as the
impartiality of the judge. A lawyer must therefore avoid any impair-
ment of his independence and be careful not to compromise his
professional standards in order to please his client, the court or third
parties.
2.1.2. This independence is necessary in non-contentious matters as well as
in litigation. Advice given by a lawyer to his client has no value if it is
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given only to ingratiate himself, to serve his personal interests or in
response to outside pressure.
2.2. Trust and Personal Integrity
Relationships of trust can only exist if a lawyer's personal honour, honesty
and integrity are beyond doubt. For the lawyer these traditional virtues are
professional obligations.
2.3. Confidentiality
2.3.1. It is of the essence of a lawyer's function that he should be told by his
client things which the client would not tell to others, and that he
should be the recipient of other information on a basis of confidence.
Without the certainty of confidentiality there cannot be trust. Confi-
dentiality is therefore a primary and fundamental right and duty of
the lawyer.
2.3.2. A lawyer shall accordingly respect the confidentiality of all informa-
tion given to him by his client, or received by him about his client or
others in the course of rendering services to his client.
2.3.3 The obligation of confidentiality is not limited in time.
2.3.4. A lawyer shall require his associates and staff and anyone engaged by
him in the course of providing professional services to observe the
same obligation of confidentiality.
2.4 Respect for the Rules of Other Bars and Law Societies
Under Community Law (in particular under the Directive 77/249 of 22nd
March 1977) a lawyer from another Member State may be bound to comply
with the rules of the Bar or Law Society of the Host Member State. Lawyers
have a duty to inform themselves as to the rules which will affect them in the
performance of any particular activity.
2.5. Incompatible Occupations
2.5.1. In order to perform his functions with due independence and in a
manner which is consistent with his duty to participate in the admin-
istration of justice a lawyer is excluded from some occupations.
2.5.2. A lawyer who acts in the representation or the defence of a client in
legal proceedings or before any public authorities in a Host Member
State shall there observe the rules regarding incompatible occupa-
tions as they are applied to lawyers of the Host Member State.
2.5.3. A lawyer established in a Host Member State in which he wishes to
participate directly in commercial or other activities not connected
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with the practice of the law shall respect the rules regarding forbid-
den or incompatible occupations as they are applied to lawyers of
that Member State.
2.6. Personal Publicity
2.6.1. A lawyer should not advertise or seek personal publicity where this is
not permitted.
In other cases a lawyer should only advertise or seek personal
publicity to the extent and in the manner permitted by the rules to
which he is subject.
2.6.2. Advertising and personal publicity shall be regarded as taking place
where it is permitted, if the lawyer concerned shows that it was placed
for the purpose of reaching clients or potential clients located where
such advertising or personal publicity is permitted and its communi-
cation elsewhere is incidental.
2.7. The Client's Interests
Subject to due observance of all rules of law and professional conduct, a
lawyer must always act in the best interests of his client and must put those
interests before his own interest or those of fellow members of the legal
profession.
3. RELATIONS WITH CLIENTS
3.1. Acceptance and Termination of Instructions
3.1.1 A lawyer shall not handle a case for a party except on his instructions.
He may, however, act in a case in which he has been instructed by
another lawyer who himself acts for the party or where the case has
been assigned to him by a competent body.
3.1.2. A lawyer shall advise and represent his client promptly, conscien-
tiously and diligently. He shall undertake personal responsibility for
the discharge of the instructions given to him. He shall keep his client
informed as to the progress of the matter entrusted to him.
3.1.3. A lawyer shall not handle a matter which he knows or ought to know
he is not competent to handle, without co-operating with a lawyer
who is competent to handle it.
A lawyer shall not accept instructions unless he can discharge those
instructions promptly having regard to the pressure of other work.
3.1.4. A lawyer shall not be entitled to exercise his right to withdraw from a
case in such a way or in such circumstances that the client may be
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unable to find other legal assistance in time to prevent prejudice
being suffered by the client.
3.2. Conflict of Interest
3.2.1. A lawyer may not advise, represent or act on behalf of two or more
clients in the same matter if there is a conflict, or a significant risk of a
conflict, between the interests of those clients.
3.2.2. A lawyer must cease to act for both clients when a conflict of interests
arises between those clients and also whenever there is a risk of a
breach of confidence or where his independence may be impaired.
3.2.3. A lawyer must also refrain from acting for a new client if there is a
risk of a breach of confidences entrusted to the lawyer by a former
client or if the knowledge which the lawyer possesses of the affairs of
the former client would give an undue advantage to the new client.
3.2.4. Where lawyers are practising in association, paragraphs 3.2.1 to 3.2.3
above shall apply to the association and all its members.
3.3. Pactum de Quota Litis
3.3.1. A lawyer shall not be entitled to make apactum de quota litis.
3.3.2. By 'pactum de quota litis' is meant an agreement between a lawyer
and his client entered into prior to the final conclusion of a matter to
which the client is a party, by virtue of which the client undertakes to
pay the lawyer a share of the result regardless of whether this is
represented by a sum of money or by any other benefit achieved by
the client upon the conclusion of the matter.
3.3.3. The pactum de quota litis does not include an agreement that fees be
charged in proportion to the value of a matter handled by the lawyer
if this is in accordance with an officially approved fee scale or under
the control of the competent authority having jurisdiction over the
lawyer.
3.4. Regulation of Fees
3.4.1. A fee charged by a lawyer shall be fully disclosed to his client and
shall be fair and reasonable.
3.4.2. Subject to any proper agreement to the contrary between a lawyer
and his client, fees charged by a lawyer shall be subject to regulation
in accordance with the rules applied to members of the Bar or Law
Society to which he belongs. If he belongs to more than one Bar or
Law Society the rules applied shall be those with the closest connec-
tion to the contract between the lawyer and his client.
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3.5. Payment on Account
If a lawyer requires a payment on account of his fees and/or disbursements
such payment should not exceed a reasonable estimate of the fees and
probable disbursements involved.
Failing such payment, a lawyer may withdraw from the case or refuse to
handle it, but subject always to paragraph 3.1.4. above.
3.6. Fee Sharing with Non-Lawyers
3.6.1. Subject as after-mentioned a lawyer may not share his fees with a
person who is not a lawyer.
3.6.2. The provisions of 6.1 above shall not preclude a lawyer from paying a
fee, commission or other compensation to a deceased lawyer's heirs
or to a retired lawyer in respect of taking over the deceased or retired
lawyer's practice.
3.7. LegalAid
A lawyer shall inform his client of the availability of legal aid where
applicable.
3.8. Client Funds
3.8.1. When lawyers at any time in the course of their practice come into
possession of funds on behalf of their clients or third parties (herein-
after called 'clients' funds') it shall be obligatory:
3.8.1.1. That clients' funds shall always be held in an account in a
bank of similar institution subject to supervision of Public
Authority and that all clients' funds received by a lawyer
should be paid into such an account unless the client explic-
itly or by implication agrees that the funds should be dealt
with otherwise.
3.8.1.2. That any account in which the clients' funds are held in the
name of the lawyer should indicate in the title or designation
that the funds are held on behalf of the client or clients of the
lawyer.
3.8.1.3. That any account or accounts in which clients' funds are held
in the name of the lawyer should at all times contain a sum
which is not less than the total of the clients' funds held by
the lawyer.
3.8.1.4. That all clients' funds should be available for payment to




3.8.1.5. That payments made from clients' funds on behalf of a client
to any other person including
a) payments made to or for one client from funds held for
another client and
b) payment of the lawyer's fees, be prohibited except to the
extent that they are permitted by law or have the express
or implied authority of the client for whom the payment is
being made.
3.8.1.6. That the lawyer shall maintain full and accurate records,
available to each client on request, showing all his dealings
with his clients' funds and distinguishing clients' funds from
other funds held by him.
3.8.1.7. That the competent authorities in all Member States should
have powers to allow them to examine and investigate on a
confidential basis the financial records of lawyer's clients'
funds to ascertain whether or not the rules which they make
are being complied with and to impose sanctions upon
lawyers who fail to comply with those rules.
3.8.2. Subject as aftermentioned, and without prejudice to the rules set out
in 3.8.1 above, a lawyer who holds clients' funds in the course of
carrying on practice in any Member State must comply with the Rules
relating to holding and accounting for clients' funds which are
applied by the competent authorities of the Home Member State.
3.8.3. A lawyer who carries on practice or provides services in a Host
Member State may with the agreement of the competent authorities
of the Home and Host Member States concerned comply with the
requirements of the Host Member State to the exclusion of the
requirements of the Home Member State. In that event he shall take
reasonable steps to inform his clients that he complies with the
requirements in force in the Host Member State.
3.9 Professional Indemnity Insurance
3.9.1. Lawyers shall be insured at all times against claims based on profes-
sional negligence to an extent which is reasonable having regard to
the nature and extent of the risks which lawyers incur in practice.
3.9.2.1. Subject as aftermentioned, a lawyer who provides services or
carries on practice in a Member State must comply with any
Rules relating to his obligation to insure against his profes-
sional liability as a lawyer which are in force in his Home
Member State.
3.9.2.2. A lawyer who is obliged so to insure in his Home Member
State and who provides services or carries on practice in any
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Host Member State shall use his best endeavours to obtain
insurance cover on the basis required in his Home Member
State extended to services which he provides or practice
which he carries on in a Host Member State.
3.9.2.3. A lawyer who fails to obtain the extended insurance cover
referred to in paragraph 3.9.2.2 above or who is not obliged
so to insure in his Home Member State and who provides
services or carries on practice in a Host Member State shall
in so far as possible obtain insurance cover against his
professional liability as a lawyer whilst acting for clients in
that Host Member State on at least an equivalent basis to
that required of lawyers in the Host Member State.
3.9.2.4. To the extent that a lawyer is unable to obtain the insurance
cover required by the foregoing rules, he shall take reason-
able steps to draw that fact to the attention of such of his
clients as might be affected in the event of a claim against
him.
3.9.2.5. A lawyer who carries on practice or provides services in a
Host Member State may with the agreement of the compe-
tent authorities of the Home and Host Member States
concerned comply with such insurance requirements as are
in force in the Host Member State to the exclusion of the
insurance requirements of the Home Member State. In this
event he shall take reasonable steps to inform his clients that
he is insured according to the requirements in force in the
Host Member State.
4. RELATIONS WITH THE COURTS
4.1. Applicable Rules of Conduct in Court
A lawyer who appears, or takes part in a case, before a court or tribunal in a
Member State must comply with the rules of conduct applied before that
court or tribunal.
4.2. Fair Conduct of Proceedings
A lawyer must always have due regard for the fair conduct of proceedings.
He must not, for example, make contact with the judge without first
informing the lawyer acting for the opposing party or submit exhibits, notes
or documents to the judge without communicating them in good time to the




4.3. Demeanour in Court
A lawyer shall while maintaining due respect and courtesy towards the court
defend the interests of his client honourably and in a way which he
considers will be to the client's best advantage within the limits of the law.
4.4. False or Misleading Information
A lawyer shall never knowingly give false or misleading information to the
court.
4.5. Extension to Arbitrators Etc.
The rules governing a lawyer's relations with the courts apply also to his
relations with arbitrators and any other persons exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, even on an occasional basis.
5. RELATIONS BETWEEN LAWYERS
5.1. Corporate Spirit of the Profession
5.1.1. The corporate spirit of the profession requires a relationship of trust
and co-operation between lawyers for the benefit of their clients and
in order to avoid unnecessary litigation. It can never justify setting the
interest of the profession against those of justice or of those who seek
it.
5.1.2. A lawyer should recognise all other lawyers of Member States as
professional colleagues and act fairly and courteously towards them.
5.2. Co-operation among Lawyers of Different Member States
5.2.1. It is the duty of a lawyer who is approached by a colleague from
another Member State not to accept instructions a in a matter which
is not competent to undertake. He should be prepared to help his
colleague to obtain the information necessary to enable him to
instruct a lawyer who is capable of providing the service asked for.
5.2.2. Where a lawyer of a Member State co-operates with a lawyer from
another Member State, both have a general duty to take into account
the differences which may exist between their respective legal sys-
tems and the professional organisations competences and obligations
of lawyers in the Member States concerned.
5.3. Correspondence Between Lawyers
5.3.1. If a lawyer sending a communication to a lawyer in another Member
State wishes it to remain confidential or without prejudice he should
clearly express this intention when communicating the document.
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5.3.2. If the recipient of the communication is unable to ensure its status as
confidential or without prejudice he should return it to the sender
without revealing the contents to others.
5.4. Referral Fees
5.4.1. A lawyer may not demand or accept from another lawyer or any other
person a fee, commission or any other compensation for referring or
recommending a client.
5.4.2. A lawyer may not pay anyone a fee, commission or any other
compensation as a consideration for referring a client to himself.
5.5. Communication with Opposing Parties
A lawyer shall not communicate about a particular case or matter directly
with any person whom he knows to be represented or advised in the case or
matter by another lawyer, without the consent of that other lawyer (and
shall keep the other lawyer informed of any such communications).
5.6. Change of Lawyer
5.6.1. A lawyer who is instructed to represent a client in substitution for
another lawyer in relation to a particular matter should inform that
other lawyer and, subject to 5.6.2. below, should not begin to act until
he has ascertained that arrangements have been made for the
settlement of the other lawyer's fees and disbursements. This duty
does not, however, make the new lawyer personally responsible for
the former lawyer's fees and disbursements.
5.6.2. If urgent steps have to be taken in the interests of the client before
the conditions in 5.6.1. above can be complied with, the lawyer may
take such steps provided he informs the other lawyer immediately.
5.7. Responsibility for Fees
In professional relations between members of Bars of different Member
States, where a lawyer does not confine himself to recommending another
lawyer or introducing him to the client but himself entrusts a correspondent
with a particular matter or seeks his advice, he is personally bound, even if
the client is insolvent, to pay the fees, costs and outlays which are due to the
foreign correspondent. The lawyers concerned may, however, at the outset
of the relationship between them make special arrangements on this matter.
Further, the instructing lawyer may at any time limit his personal responsi-
bility to the amount of the fees, costs and outlays incurred before intimation
to the foreign lawyer of his disclaimer of responsibility for the future.
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5.8. Training Young Lawyers
In order to improve trust and co-operation amongst lawyers of different
Member States for the clients' benefit there is a need to encourage a better
knowledge of the laws and procedures in different Member States. There-
fore when considering the need for the profession to give good training to
young lawyers, lawyers should take into account the need to give training to
young lawyers from other Member States.
5.9. Disputes Amongst Lawyers in Different Member States
5.9.1. If a lawyer considers that a colleague in another Member State has
acted in breach of a rule of professional conduct he shall draw the
matter to the attention of his colleague.
5.9.2. If any personal dispute of a professional nature arises amongst
lawyers in different Member States they should if possible first try to
settle it in a friendly way.
5.9.3. A lawyer shall not commence any form of proceedings against a
colleague in another Member State on matters referred to in 5.9.1. or
5.9.2. above without first informing the Bars or Law Societies to
which they both belong for the purpose of allowing both Bars or Law
Societies concerned an opportunity to assist in reaching a settlement.
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APPENDIX C
ExPLANA TORY MEMORANDUM AND COMMENTARY ON THE
CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS iN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
This Explanatory Memorandum and Commentary is prepared at the re-
quest of the CCBE Standing Committee by the CCBE's Deontology Work-
ing Party, who were responsible for the drafting of the Code of Conduct
itself. It seeks to explain the origin of the provisions of the Code, to
illustrate the problems which they are designed to resolve, particularly in
relation to cross-border activities, and to provide assistance to the compe-
tent authorities in the Member States in the application of the Code. It is
not intended to have any binding force in the interpretation of the Code.
The original versions of the Code are in the French and English languages.
Translations into other Community languages are being prepared under the
authority of the National Delegations concerned.
1. PREAMBLE
1.1 The Function of the Lawyer in Society
The Declaration of Perugia, adopted by the CCBE in 1977, laid down the
fundamental principles of professional conduct applicable to lawyers
throughout the European Community. The provisions of Article 1.1 reaf-
firm the statement in the Declaration of Perugia of the function of the
lawyer in society which forms the basis for the rules governing the perfor-
mance of that function.
1.2 The Nature of Rules of Professional Conduct
These provisions substantially restate the explanation in the Declaration of
Perugia of the nature of rules of professional conduct and how particular
rules depend on particular local circumstances but are nevertheless based
on common values.
1.3 The Purpose of the Code
These provisions introduce the development of the principles in the Decla-
ration of Perugia into a specific Code of Conduct for Lawyers throughout
the European Community, with particular reference to their cross-border
activities (defined in 1.5 below).
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The provisions of Article 1.3.2 lay down the specific intentions of the CCBE
with regard to the substantive provisions in the Code.
1.4 Field of Application Ratione Personae
The rules are here stated to apply to all the lawyers of the European
Community as defined in the Lawyers Services Directive of 1977. This
includes lawyers of the Member States which subsequently acceded to the
treaty, whose names have been added by amendment to the Directive. It





























Although the competence of the CCBE extends only to Member States,
representatives of the observer delegations to the CCBE from European
States which are not members of the Community (Austria, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Finland and Cyprus) have participated in the work on
the Code. It is believed that its provisions are acceptable in those States
and it is hoped that the Code can be applied as between them and the
Member States by appropriate conventions. It is also hoped that the Code
will be acceptable to the legal professions of other non-Member States in
Europe and elsewhere so that it could also be applied in the same way be-
tween them and the Member States.
1.5 Field of Application Ratione Materiae
The rules are here given direct application only to 'cross-border activities,'
as defined, of lawyers within the European Community. (See also on 1.4
above as to possible extensions in the future to lawyers of other States). The
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definition of cross-border activities would, for example, include contacts in
State A even on a matter of law internal to State A between a lawyer of
State A and a lawyer of State B; it would exclude contacts between lawyers
of State A in State A on a matter arising in State B, provided that none of
their professional activities takes place in State B; it would include any
activities of lawyers of State A in State B, even if only in the form of
communications sent from State A to State B.
1.6 Definitions
This provision defines 3 terms used in the Code, "Home Member State",
"Host Member State" and "competent authority". The references to "Mem-
ber State" include, where appropriate, separate jurisdictions within a single
Member State. The reference to "the bar or law society to which the lawyer
belongs" includes the bar or law society responsible for exercising authority
over the lawyer. The reference to "where the lawyer carries on cross-border
activities" should be interpreted in the light of the definition of "cross-
border activities" in Article 1.5, in particular 1.5(b).
2. GENERAL RULES
2.1 Independence
This provision substantially reaffirms the general statement of principle in
the Declaration of Perugia.
2.2 Trust and Personal Integrity
This provision also restates a general principle contained in the Declaration
of Perugia.
2.3 Confidentiality
This provision first restates, in Article 2.3.1, general principles laid down in
the Declaration of Perugia and recognized by the European Court of
Justice in the AM&S Case (157/79). It then, in Articles 2.3.2/4, develops
them into a specific rule relating to the protection of confidentiality. Article
2.3.2 contains the basic rule requiring respect for confidentiality. Article
2.3.3 confirms that the obligation remains binding on the lawyer even if he
ceases to act for the client in question. Article 2.3.4 confirms that the lawyer
must not only respect the obligation of confidentiality himself but must
require all members and employees of his firm to do likewise.
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2.4 Respect for the Rules of Other Bars and Law Societies
Article 4 of the Lawyers Services Directive of 1977 contains the provisions
with regard to the rules to be observed by a lawyer from one Member State
providing services by virtue of Article 59 of the Treaty in another Member
State as follows:
1. Activities relating to the representation of a client in legal proceedings
or before public authorities shall be pursued in each Host Member
State under the conditions laid down for lawyers established in that
State, with the exception of any conditions requiring residence, or
registration with a professional organization, in that State.
2. A lawyer pursuing these activities shall observe the rules of profes-
sional conduct of the Host Member State, without prejudice to his
obligations in the Member State from which he comes.
3. When these activities are pursued in the United Kingdom, 'rules of
professional conduct of the Host Member State' means the rules of
professional conduct applicable to solicitors, where such activities are
not reserved for barristers and advocates. Otherwise the rules of
professional conduct applicable to the latter shall apply. However,
barristers from Ireland shall always be subject to the rules of profes-
sional conduct applicable in the United Kingdom to barristers and
advocates.
When these activities are pursued in Ireland 'rules of professional
conduct of the Host Member State' means, in so far as they govern the
oral presentation of a case in court, the rules of professional conduct
applicable to barristers. In all other cases the rules of professional
conduct applicable to solicitors shall apply. However, barristers and
advocates from the United Kingdom shall always be subject to the rule
os professional conduct applicable in Ireland to barristers.
4. A lawyer pursuing activities other than those referred to in paragraph
1 shall remain subject to the conditions and rules of professional
conduct of the Member State from which he comes without prejudice
to respect for the rules, whatever their source, which govern the
profession in the Host Member State, especially those concerning the
incompatibility of the exercise of the activities of a lawyer with the
exercise of other activities in that State, professional secrecy, relations
with other lawyers, the prohibition on the same lawyer acting for
parties with mutually conflicting interests, and publicity. The latter
rules are applicable only if they are capable of being observed by a
lawyer who is not established in the Host Member State and to the
extent to which their observance is objectively justified to ensure, in
that State, the proper exercise of a lawyer's activities, the standing of
the profession and respect for the rules concerning incompatibility.
1993]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
In cases not covered by this Directive, the obligations of a lawyer under
Community law to observe the rules of other bars and law societies are a
matter of interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Treaty or any
other relevant Directive. A major purpose of the Code is to minimize, and if
possible eliminate altogether, the problems which may arise from "double
deontology", that is the application of more than one set of potentially
conflicting national rules to a particular situation (see Article 1.3.1).
2.5 Incompatible Occupations
There are differences both between and within Member States on the
extent to which lawyers are permitted to engage in other occupations, for
example in commercial activities. The general purpose of rules excluding a
lawyer from other occupations is to protect him from influences which
might impair his independence or his role in the administration of justice.
The variations in these rules reflect different local conditions, different
perceptions of the proper function of lawyers and different techniques of
rule-making. For instance in some cases there is a complete prohibition of
engagement in certain named occupations, whereas in other cases engage-
ment in other occupations is generally permitted, subject to observance of
specific safeguards for the lawyer's independence.
Articles 2.5.2 and 3 make provisions for different circumstances in which
a lawyer of one Member State is engaging in cross-border activities (as
defined in Article 1.5) in a Host Member State when he is not a member of
the Host Member State legal profession.
Article 2.5.2 imposes full observation of Host Member State rules regard-
ing incompatible occupations on the lawyer acting in national legal proceed-
ings or before national public authorities in the Host Member State. This
applies whether the lawyer is established in the Host State or not.
Article 2.5.3, on the other hand, imposes "respect" for the rules of the
Host State regarding forbidden or incompatible occupations in other cases,
but only where the lawyer who is established in the Host Member State
wishes to participate directly in commercial or other activities not con-
nected with the practice of the law.
2.6 Personal Publicity
The term "personal publicity" covers publicity by firms of lawyers, as well as
individual lawyers, as opposed to corporate publicity organized by bars and
law societies for their members as a whole. The rules governing personal
publicity by lawyers vary considerably in the Member States. In some there
is a complete prohibition of personal publicity by lawyers; in others this
prohibition has been (or is in the process of being) relaxed substantially.
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Article 2.6 does not therefore attempt to lay down a general standard on
personal publicity.
Article 2.6.1 requires a lawyer not to advertise or seek personal publicity
in a territory where this is not permitted to local lawyers. Otherwise he is
required to observe the rules on publicity laid down by his own bar or law
society.
Article 2.6.2 contains provisions clarifying the question of the place in
which advertising and personal publicity is deemed to take place. For
example, a lawyer who is permitted to advertise in his Home Member State
may place an advertisement in a newspaper published ,there which circu-
lates primarily in that Member State, even though some issues may circulate
in other Member States where lawyers are not permitted to advertise. He
may not, however, place an advertisement in a newspaper whose circulation
is directed wholly or mainly at a territory where lawyers are not permitted to
advertise in that way.
2.7 The Client's Interests
This provision emphasises the general principle that the lawyer must always
place the client's interests before his own interests or those of fellow
members of the legal profession.
3. RELATIONS WITH CLIENTS
3.1 Acceptance and Termination of Instructions
The provisions of Article 3.1.1 are designed to ensure that a relationship is
maintained between lawyer and client and that the lawyer in fact receives
instructions from the client, even though these may be transmitted through
a duly authorized intermediary. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to
satisfy himself as to the authority of the intermediary and the wishes of the
client.
Article 3.1.2 deals with the manner in which the lawyer should carry out
his duties. The provision that he shall undertake personal responsibility for
the discharge of the instructions given to him means that he cannot avoid
responsibility by delegation to others. It does not prevent him from seeking
to limit his legal liability to the extent that this is permitted by the relevant
law or professional rules.
Article 3.1.3 states a principle which is of particular relevance in cross-
border activities, for example when a lawyer is asked to handle a matter on
behalf of a lawyer or client from another State who may be unfamiliar with
the relevant law and practice, or when a lawyer is asked to handle a matter
relating to the law of another State with which he is unfamiliar.
A lawyer generally has the right to refuse to accept instructions in the first
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place, but Article 3.1.4 states that, having once accepted them, he has an
obligation not to withdraw without ensuring that the client's interests are
safeguarded.
3.2 Conflict of Interest
The provisions of 3.2.1 do not prevent a lawyer acting for two or more
clients in the same matter provided that their interests are not in fact in
conflict and that there is no significant risk of such a conflict arising. Where
a lawyer is already acting for two or more clients in this way and subse-
quently there arises a conflict of interests between those clients or a risk of a
breach of confidence or other circumstances where his independence may
be impaired, then the lawyer must cease to act for both or all of them.
There may, however, be circumstances in which differences arise between
two or more clients for whom the same lawyer is acting where it may be
appropriate for him to attempt to act as a mediator. It is for the lawyer in
such cases to use his own judgment on whether or not there is such a conflict
of interest between them as to require him to cease to act. If not, he may
consider whether it would be appropriate for him to explain the position to
the clients, obtain their agreement and attempt to act as mediator to resolve
the difference between them, and only if this attempt to mediate shall fail,
to cease to act for them.
Article 3.2.4 applies the foregoing provisions of Article 3 to lawyers
practising in association. For example a firm of lawyers should cease to act
when there is a conflict of interest between two clients of the firm, even if
different lawyers in the firm are acting for each client. On the other hand,
exceptionally, in the "chambers" form of association used by English
barristers, where each lawyer acts for clients individually, it is possible for
different lawyers in the association to act for clients with opposing interests.
3.3 Pactum de Quota Litis
These provisions reflect the common position in all Member States that an
unregulated agreement for contingency fees (Pactum de Quota Litis) is
contrary to the proper administration of justice because it encourages
speculative litigation and is liable to be abused. The provisions are not,
however, intended to prevent the maintenance or introduction of arrange-
ments under which lawyers are paid according to results or only if the action
or matter is successful, provided that these arrangements are under suffi-




3.4 Regulation of Fees
Article 3.4.1 lays down a general standard of disclosure of a lawyers' fees to
the client and a requirement that they should be fair and reasonable in
amount. Article 3.4.2 deals with the question of the machinery for regulat-
ing the lawyers' fees. In many Member States such machinery exists under
national law or rules of conduct, whether by reference to a power of
adjudication by the "Batonnier" or otherwise. Article 3.4.1 applies the rules
of the bar or law society to which the lawyer belongs (see on Article 1.6
above) unless this has been varied by an agreement between lawyer and
client which is in accordance with the relevant law or rules of conduct. It
goes on to provide a "choice of law" rule to deal with cases when the lawyer
belongs to more than one bar or law society.
3.5 Payment on Account
Article 3.5 assures that a lawyer may require a payment on account of his
fees and/or disbursements, but sets a limit by reference to a reasonable
estimate of them. See also on Article 3.1.4 regarding the right to withdraw.
3.6 Fee Sharing with Non-Lawyers
In some Member States lawyers are permitted to practise in association
with members of certain other approved professions, whether legal profes-
sions or not. The provisions of Article 3.6.1 are not designed to prevent fee
sharing within such an approved form of association. Nor are the provisions
designed to prevent fee sharing by the lawyers to whom the Code applies
(see on Article 1.4 above) with other "lawyers", for example lawyers from
non-Member States or members of other legal professions in the Member
States such as notaries or conseils juridiques.
3.7 LegalAid
Article 3.7 requires a lawyer to inform his client of the availability of legal
aid where applicable. There are widely differing provisions in the Member
States on the availability of legal aid. In cross-border activities a lawyer
should have in mind the possibility that the legal aid provisions of a national
law with which he is unfamiliar may be applicable.
3.8 Clients' Funds
The provisions of Article 3.8.1 reflect the Recommendation adopted by the
CCBE in Brussels in November 1985 on the need for minimum regulations
to be made and enforced governing the proper control and disposal of
clients' funds held by lawyers within the Community. In some Member
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States such regulations have not yet been introduced for internal purposes.
Article 3.8.1.2-7 lays down minimum standards to be observed, while not
interfering with the details of national systems which provide fuller or more
stringent protection for clients funds.
The provisions of Articles 3.8.2 and 3.8.3 deal with questions which arise
where the rules on clients' funds of more than one Member State may be
applicable.
3.9 Professional Indemnity Insurance
Article 3.9.1 reflects a Recommendation, also adopted by the CCBE in
Brussels in November 1985, on the need for all lawyers in the Community to
be insured against the risks arising from professional negligence claims
against them.
Again in some Member States such an obligation has not yet been
introduced for internal purposes. Article 3.9.2 deals with questions which
arise when the risks to be insured relate to more than one Member State.
4. RELATIONS WITH THE COURTS
4.1 Applicable Rules of Conduct in Court
This provision applies the principle that a lawyer is bound to comply with
the rules of the court or tribunal before which he practises or appears.
4.2 Fair Conduct of Proceedings
This provision applies the general principle that in adversarial proceedings
a lawyer must not attempt to take unfair advantage of his opponent, in
particular by unilateral communications with the judge. An exception
however is made for any steps permitted under the relevant rules of the
court in question (see also on 4.5 below).
4.3 Demeanour in Court
This provision reflects the necessary balance between respect for the court
and for the law on the one hand and the pursuit of the client's best interests
on the other.
4.4 False or Misleading Information
This provision applies the principle that the lawyer must never knowingly
mislead the court. This is necessary if there is to be trust between the courts
and the legal profession.
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4.5 Extension to Arbitrators Etc.
This provision extends the preceding provisions relating to courts to other
bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
5. RELATIONS BETWEEN LAWYERS
5.1 Corporate Spirit of the Profession
These provisions, which are based on statements in the Declaration of
Perugia, emphasise that it is in the public interest for the legal profession to
maintain a relationship of trust and co-operation between its members.
However this cannot be used to justify setting the interests of the profession
against those of justice or of clients (see also on Article 2.7 above).
5.2 Co-operation among Lawyers of Different Member States
This provision also develops a principle stated in the Declaration of Perugia
with a view to avoiding misunderstandings in dealings between lawyers of
different Member States.
5.3 Correspondence between Lawyers
In certain Member States communications between lawyers (written or by
word of mouth) are normally regarded as confidential. This means that
lawyers accept that those communications may not be disclosed to others
and copies may not be sent to the lawyers' own client. This principle is
recognised in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain. Such communications if in writing are often marked as "confidential"
or "sous la foi du Palais".
In the United Kingdom and Ireland the notion of "confidentiality" is
different in that it refers not to such communications between lawyers but to
the lawyer's right and duty to keep his client's affairs confidential. However
communications between lawyers made in order to attempt to settle a
dispute are normally not regarded by a court as admissible evidence and the
lawyer should not attempt to use them as evidence. If a lawyer wishes to
indicate that he regards a document as such a communication he should
indicate that it is sent "without prejudice". This means that the letter is sent
without prejudice to and under reservation of the client's rights in the
dispute.
In Denmark as a general rule, a lawyer has a right and duty to keep his
client informed about all important correspondence from a lawyer acting
for an opposing party, in practice normally by sending photocopies. This
rule applies whether or not the letter is marked "without prejudice" or
"confidential". As an exception, lawyers may exchange views - normally by
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word of mouth only - on a case with a view to finding an amicable
settlement, on the mutual understanding that such communications should
be kept confidential and not disclosed to the clients. A lawyer is not legally
bound by such a confidence, but to break it would prejudice his future
participation in such confidential exchanges. Some lawyers do not wish to
receive such communication in any form without having the right to inform
their clients; in that event they should inform the other lawyer before he
makes such a confidential communication to them. As a general rule also,
all correspondence between lawyers may be freely produced in court.
Normally, however, if such correspondence is marked "without prejudice"
or, even if not so marked, it is clearly of a "without prejudice" nature, the
court will disregard it and the lawyer producing it will be treated as being in
contravention of the rules of Professional Conduct.
In the Netherlands legal recourse based on communications between
lawyers may not be sought, unless the interest of the client requires it and
only after prior consultation with the lawyer for the other party. If such
consultation does not lead to a solution, the advice of the Dean should be
sought before recourse to law. The content of settlement negotiations
between lawyers may not be communicated to the court without the
permission of the lawyer for the other party, unless the right to do so was
expressly reserved when the settlement proposal in question was made.
There is however no general rule preventing a lawyer from sending copies of
such communications to his client.
In Germany communications between lawyers are not confidential. The
lawyer has an obligation to communicate them to his client and they may be
admitted as evidence in court.
These differences often give rise to misunderstandings between lawyers
of different Member States who correspond with each other. For this reason
lawyers should be particularly careful to clarify the basis upon which
correspondence with lawyers in other Member States is sent and received.
In particular a lawyer who wishes to make a confidential or "without
prejudice" communication to a colleague in a Member State where the
rules may be different should ask in advance whether it can be accepted as
such.
5.4 Referral Fees
This provision reflects the principle that a lawyer should not pay or receive
payment purely for the reference of a client, which would risk impairing the
client's free choice of lawyer or his interest in being referred to the best
available service. It does not prevent fee sharing arrangements between
lawyers on a proper basis (see also on Article 3.6 above).
In some Member States lawyers are permitted to accept and retain
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commissions in certain cases provided the client's best interests are served,
there is full disclosure to him and he has consented to the retention of the
commission. In such cases the retention of the commission by the lawyer
represents part of his remuneration for the service provided to the client
and is not within the scope of the prohibition on referral fees which is
designed to prevent lawyers from making a secret profit.
5.5 Communication with Opposing Parties
This provision reflects a generally accepted principle, and is designed both
to promote the smooth conduct of business between lawyers and to prevent
any attempt to take advantage of the client of another lawyer.
5.6 Change of Lawyer
This provision is designed to promote the orderly handing over of the
business when there is a change of lawyer. It also reflects the commonly
accepted principle in Member States that there is some duty on the new
lawyer in respect of the settlement of the former lawyer's account. This duty
is not, however, generally accepted as being more than a duty to ascertain
that arrangements have been made for the settlement.
5.7 Responsibility for Fees
These provisions substantially reaffirm provisions contained in the Declara-
tion of Perugia. Since misunderstandings about responsibility for unpaid
fees are a common cause of difference between lawyers of different Member
States, it is important that a lawyer who wishes to exclude or limit his
personal obligation to be responsible for the fees of his foreign colleague
should reach a clear agreement on this at the outset of the transaction.
5.8 Training Young Lawyers
This provision is by way of an exhortation emphasising the general obliga-
tion of the members of the legal profession in the European Community to
ensure that future generations of lawyers in each Member State have
knowledge of the laws and procedures in other Member States.
5.9 Disputes amongst Lawyers in Different Member States
A lawyer has the right to pursue any legal or other remedy to which he is
entitled against a colleague in another Member State. Nevertheless it is
desirable that, where a breach of a rule of professional conduct or a dispute
of a professional nature is involved, the possibilities of friendly settlement
should be exhausted, if necessary with the assistance of the bars or law
societies concerned, before such remedies are exercised.
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